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Abstract
This paper presents latest thinking from the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ Model Risk Working
Party and follows on from their Phase I work, Model Risk: Daring to Open the Black Box. This
is a more practical paper and presents the contributors’ experiences of model risk gained from a
wide range of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial organisations with suggestions for good practice and proven
methods to reduce model risk. After a recap of the Phase I work, examples of model risk commu-
nication are given covering communication: to the Board; to the regulator; and to external stakeholders.
We present a practical framework for model risk management and quantiﬁcation with examples of the
key actors, processes and cultural challenge. Lessons learned are then presented from other industries
that make extensive use of models and include the weather forecasting, software and aerospace
industries. Finally, a series of case studies in practical model risk management and mitigation are
presented from the contributors’ own experiences covering primarily ﬁnancial services.
Keywords
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1. Model Risk: Daring to Open the Black Box
1.1.1. TheModel RiskWorking Party’s Phase 1 paper,Model Risk: Daring to Open the Black Box, was
well received and was awarded the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) Peter Clark prize for best
paper, 2015. As a result a Phase 2 of the working party was established to take forward some of the
ideas presented in Phase 1 and these are presented in this paper. We begin by summarising the main
themes from the Phase 1 paper including the core notion of a Model Risk Management Framework.
1.1.2. First, we recap the deﬁnition of a model. In the words of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (2011):
1.1.3. [T]he term model refers to a quantitative method, system, or approach that applies statistical,
economic, ﬁnancial, or mathematical theories, techniques, and assumptions to process input data into
quantitative estimates. A model consists of three components: an information input component, which
delivers assumptions and data to the model; a processing component, which transforms inputs into
estimates; and a reporting component, which translates the estimates into useful business information.
*Correspondence to: Rob Black, Standard Life House, 30 Lothian Road, Edinburgh EH1 2DH, UK
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1.1.4. The concept of model risk is therefore twofold:
∙ models may have fundamental errors and may produce inaccurate outputs when viewed against
the design objectives and intended business uses; and
∙ a model may be used incorrectly or inappropriately.
1.1.5. The Phase I paper summarised a number of high-proﬁle examples of model error that serve as
salutary case studies, including the well-documented Long-Term Capital Management Hedge Fund
collapse (1997), the bidding for the West Coast Rail Franchise (2012) and the JP Morgan “London
whale” trading event (2012).
1.1.6. We highlighted that model risk is not as well deﬁned and established as other more traditional
risks, so the identiﬁcation, understanding and communication of model risk is crucial.
1.1.7. The paper proposed a Model Risk Management Framework consisting of a cycle as shown in
Figure 1 – and elements of this are explored further in this paper. Such a framework should be
applied to those models which are most business-critical for the purposes of decision-making,
ﬁnancial reporting, etc.
1.1.8. Each part of the Model Risk Management Framework was explored in some detail and
suggestions made as to how such a framework could have prevented or mitigated some of the case
studies documented. It is worth recalling here the main features of each part of the framework.
1.1.9.Overall model risk governance: In order to put in place appropriate governance around model
risk, an organisation should establish an overarching Model Risk Policy which sets out the roles and
responsibilities of the various stakeholders in the model risk management process, accompanied by
Model Risk
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Figure 1. The Model Risk Management Framework
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more detailed modelling standards which set out speciﬁc requirements for the development, vali-
dation and use of models.
1.1.10. Model risk appetite: The Board’s appetite for model risk needs to be deﬁned and articulated into
a risk appetite statement. Speciﬁcally, the Board has to establish the extent of its willingness, or otherwise,
to accept results from complex models, and its tolerance for accuracy around the results from these models.
As with any risk, the risk appetite for model risk should be articulated in the form of appetite statements or
risk tolerances, translated into speciﬁc metrics with associated limits for the extent of model risk the Board
is prepared to take. Examples of metrics that could be considered in a model risk appetite statement are:
∙ Extent to which all models have been identiﬁed and risk assessed; extent to which models are
compliant with Standards applicable to their materiality rating; number of high residual risk
models; number of high risk limitations/ﬁndings; duration of outstanding or overdue remediation
activities; key person dependencies around high materiality models.
∙ The company’s position against the model risk appetite should be monitored by the individual or
body responsible for the risk management of models on a regular basis, and should allow
management to identify where actions are needed to restore positions within risk limits.
1.1.11.Model risk identiﬁcation: We need to identify the model risks to which the company is exposed.
In order to do this, it is necessary to identify all existing models and key model changes or new
developments. For existing models, an inventory should be created in which each team or department lists
all models in use. All models ﬁtting the deﬁnition in section 1.1.2 should be considered. Models should be
listed by usage/purpose, in order to ensure consistency in approach and a pragmatic usable inventory. The
data collected on each model should be sufﬁciently detailed to allow a risk rating to be determined for
each model and hence the extent to which the Model Risk Management Framework needs to be applied.
1.1.12. Model risk ﬁltering: The model risk identiﬁcation step will likely identify a large number of
models and model developments in an organisation. A materiality ﬁlter should therefore be applied
(in line with the ﬁrm’s model risk appetite) to identify those models which present a material risk to
the organisation as a whole and which need to be robustly managed.
1.1.13. Model risk assessment: Having identiﬁed the material models, the next step is to assess the
extent of model risk for each material model or model development. This can be attempted as a
quantitative or a qualitative assessment. For example, sensitivities to key assumptions, outcomes of
model validations/audits, or where it cannot be evidenced that model components have been through
a recognised testing process then the models and output will generally be accepted as more risky.
1.1.14. Model risk mitigation: As a result of monitoring, the ﬁrm should know whether it is within or
outside its model risk appetite. If outside then relevant actions to bring the company back into its
appetite within an appropriate timeframe should be proposed. For example, model changes to remediate
known material issues; additional model validation may be appropriate; an overlay of expert judgement
should be applied to the model output to address the uncertainty inherent in the model; applying
additional prudence to model assumptions; or explicitly holding additional operational risk capital.
1.1.15. Model risk monitoring and reporting: Model risk management information (MI) presented to
the Board should enable effective oversight of model risk. The MI should be set out in terms which are
meaningful to the Board, should focus on the company’s material models, and should ideally be tailored
to the cultures of the stakeholders on the Board and relevant sub-committees (see section 1.1.16).
Model risk: illuminating the black box
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Example content might include: the organisation’s overall model risk proﬁle compared with its agreed
appetite; recommended actions to restore model risk proﬁle back to within appetite; outcomes of key
model validations highlighting any issues or areas of weakness; any emerging trends or risks with model
risk whether within the organisation or from regulatory/industry developments.
1.1.16. Central to any model risk governance framework is the acceptance that different cultures and
user perspectives co-exist within any organisation. We identiﬁed four prevalent types or “cultures”
of users of models all with valid perspectives on model risk, as shown in Figure 2:
∙ conﬁdent model users believe that good decision-making can and should be driven by models;
∙ conscientious modellers are primarily concerned with the technical validity of a model;
∙ uncertainty avoiders view all risks that matter as ever-changing and interconnected and doubt that
any model can truly be “ﬁt for purpose”; and
∙ intuitive decision-makers make decisions based on instinct and just use models to justify their intuition.
1.1.17. Recognising that the four perspectives above are all valid viewpoints, the paper argued that
governance and controls to manage model risk often do not consider the different perspectives on the
model that can exist in an organisation. Suggestions were made as to how to correct this.
In particular, the inclusion of non-technical, commercially oriented perspectives in model governance
is necessary, even though this might be uncomfortable for technical model reviewers.
1.1.18. The paper concluded by focussing on model risk measurement and made attempts to quantify
model risk, where possible, in the areas of proxy modelling, longevity and ﬁnancial planning models.
Finally, parallels were found in non-ﬁnancial models such as those used for environmental protection.
1.1.19. Phase 2: In response to feedback from Phase 1, the Working Party was sponsored to continue
to develop thought leadership on the subject of model risk through a second phase, with the remit to
focus speciﬁcally on expanding on the following areas:
∙ further case studies and their relevance to the actuarial world;
∙ model risk communication – internally to the Board and externally to regulators, investors and
other third parties;
Intuitive decision
makers
Unknown Knowns
Market Realities
Confident model 
users
Known Knowns
Optimality
Uncertainty avoiders
Unknown Unknowns
Robustness
Conscientious 
modellers
Known Unknowns
Fitness for Purpose
Confidence /
low concern for model uncertainty
Didiffidence / 
high concern for model uncertainty
High legitimacy
of modelling
Low legitimacy
of modelling
Figure 2. Alternative perceptions of modelling and its uses
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∙ how practically to implement a model risk management framework;
∙ a standard approach to model risk assessment/quantiﬁcation;
∙ insights on good model risk management practices that can be learned from other industries; and
∙ application for actuaries working in various ﬁelds (Insurance, Pensions and Banking, etc.).
1.1.20. We therefore look to address each of these areas in this paper although we do not attempt to
set out any explicit (new) quantitative evidence to support our thinking.
1.1.21. In particular, we present a number of further case studies where model risk has raised itself in
the public consciousness (section 2). We then consider what effective communication around model
risk to a company’s Board, the regulator and external stakeholders might look like, recognising that
all have different perspectives and levels of understanding around the model risk that a company
runs (section 3). We then present how to practically implement a model risk management framework
(section4) by assigning key model roles and most effectively leveraging a central model inventory,
and addressing speciﬁcally how third party software risks, model reviews and cultural challenges
around models, can be practically managed. In addition, we propose a framework for model risk
quantiﬁcation based on different sources of data. In section 5 we consider lessons learned from other
(non-ﬁnancial) industries including Weather Forecasting and Software. In section 6 we present some
practical applications of reducing model risk for actuaries working in various ﬁelds based on the
authors’ own experiences, and ﬁnally in section 7 we conclude with some summary remarks.
2. Further Model Risk Case Studies
Following feedback from Phase 1, we provide further real world case studies of models “badly
behaving”, helping bring to life sources of model risk and its management, and we highlight the
relevant considerations for actuarial modelling.
We present three examples below: NASA’s loss of its Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) in 1999;
modelling of the Cumbria ﬂoods in 2015; and the seminal paper “Growth in a Time of Debt” that
was used by policy-makers to promote an austerity agenda following the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
2.1. Loss of NASA’s MCO (1999)
2.1.1. Background: In 1998, NASA launched the MCO with the aim of collecting information to
enable better understanding of the Martian climate. In September 1999, the space probe was “lost”
(NASA, 2000b). The trajectory of the spacecraft had been incorrectly calculated, which meant that
the spacecraft had actually been orbiting much closer to Mars than had been targeted causing the
space probe to disintegrate in the planet’s atmosphere (NASA, 2009).
2.1.2. Detail: An investigation was conducted by the MCO Mishap Investigation Board to under-
stand what had caused the error which lead to the destruction of the $125 million space probe. The
initial report (NASA, 1999b) released following the investigation described the root cause and other
signiﬁcant factors that contributed to the space probe loss.
2.1.3. The root cause was the use of incorrect units in part of the navigation software. Thruster
performance data had been provided by software produced by an external contractor, in English
units of pound-seconds. This was contrary to the documentation in place – Software Interface
Model risk: illuminating the black box
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Speciﬁcation (SIS) – which detailed that the results should be supplied in metric units. The navigation
team at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory mistook this data as being in the required metric units of
Newton-seconds. This led to the errors in the spacecraft’s trajectory calculations.
2.1.4. The root cause, although important, was not deemed to be the sole factor causing the MCO
loss. This was because “sufﬁcient processes are usually in place on projects to catch these mistakes
before they become critical to mission success. Unfortunately for MCO, the root cause was not
caught by the processes in-place in the MCO project”.
2.1.5. Other contributing factors that “allowed this error to be born, and then let it linger and
propagate to the point where it resulted in a major error in our understanding of the spacecraft’s
path as it approached Mars” included:
∙ inadequate consideration of the entire mission and its post-launch operation as a total system;
∙ inadequate training;
∙ lack of complete end-to-end veriﬁcation and validation of navigation software and related
computer models;
∙ inadequate communication between the different teams; and
∙ absence of a fault-tree analysis process for determining “what could go wrong” during the
mission.
2.1.6. In addition, a second report prepared by the MCO Mishap Investigation Board
discussed lessons learned from the MCO failure as well as failures from other failed missions (NASA,
2000a).
2.1.7. One key theme that ran through the second report was the need for a shift in culture. The
MCO mission had been created under NASA’s “Faster, Better, Cheaper” philosophy and did not
“adequately instil a mission success culture that would shore up the risk introduced by these cuts”. It
was felt that there had been too much emphasis placed on cost and schedule reduction. The graph
below has been taken from page 11 of the second report. It highlights how the board felt that a
balance needed to be struck against cost cutting and risk identiﬁcation and management.
2.1.8. In addition, the second report detailed the Board’s proposal for a new alternative vision of
“Mission Success First”. Under this vision it was intended that “all individuals should feel ownership
and accountability, not only for their own work, but for the success of the entire mission”. It was
R. Black et al.
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intended that Risk “becomes the ‘fourth dimension’ of project management — treated equally as
important as cost and schedule”.
2.1.9. Lessons NASA learnt from the MCO loss: The initial report outlined a number of recom-
mendations including:
∙ the use of consistent units as well as audits for all data being transferred between teams;
∙ models should be validated and a comparison of different navigation methods considered;
∙ additional training and speciﬁc information should be provided which should include face-to-face
meetings between teams. Team members should be trained in software processes but also in the
use and the importance of following the documentation;
∙ the number of new and relatively inexperienced members should be balanced with the addition of
more experienced personnel. Contingency plans should also be prepared for backing up key
personnel for mission-critical functions;
∙ roles, responsibilities and accountabilities should be deﬁned clearly;
∙ it should be stressed to staff that communication is critical and that team members should feel
empowered to forcefully elevate any concerns;
∙ an increase in the amount of formal and informal face-to-face communications as well as a
“routine forum for informal communication between all team members at the same time so
everyone can hear what is happening (eg, a 15 minute stand-up tag-up meeting every morning)”.
Co-locations of key project team members could also enable this;
∙ a “Mission Safety First” attitude should be adopted;
∙ independent peer reviews of mission critical events; and
∙ a more robust veriﬁcation and validation process of the software development and testing. The
Board recommended that a “system veriﬁcation matrix for all project requirements” be developed
which should be reviewed at all major reviews.
2.1.10. Considerations for actuarial models: The issues highlighted in this case study could arguably
be just as easily found in the models used by a wide range of industries. The issues uncovered related
to inadequate external data quality and validation as well as inappropriate model methodology and
governance.
2.1.11. First, this case study highlights the need for care when dealing with models; the simplest
of errors can have a detrimental impact. This can be thought to hold true for most models –
inappropriate data are a common source of model risk.
2.1.12. It was undisputed that the root cause of the MCO loss was the human error of the navigation
data not being converted into the correct units. However, as was mentioned throughout the Investigation
Board’s reports, it was believed that this simple error itself was the not main issue. The main issue was the
fact that the error had gone unnoticed despite a number of quality control processes being in place.
2.1.13. “Our inability to recognize and correct this simple error has had major implications”, said
Dr Edward Stone, director of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA (1999a).
2.1.14. The key reasons behind this inability ran through the two ﬁndings reports as two key themes:
an inappropriate culture and inadequate communication. These two key themes are applicable to
Model risk: illuminating the black box
7
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321717000150
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 23 Oct 2017 at 14:22:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
most models and this case study raises a number of questions relating to model risk in other
industries such as insurance.
2.1.15. As we have seen through work recently done in response to Solvency II, there is a vast
amount of process documentation and data directories now in place to support model use. But can
we ensure that such documentation is being used effectively and not just being ignored (similar to the
treatment of the SIS in this case study)?
2.1.16. Interestingly, members of the operations navigation team did have concerns about the
trajectory of the space probe before the spacecraft was lost. However, these concerns were not
effectively communicated to the other teams. The Board found the operation navigation team to be
“somewhat isolated” to other teams by “inadequate communication”. Are we using communication
effectively as part of our model risk mitigation procedures?
2.1.17. Furthermore, the Faster, Better, Cheaper philosophy may arguably be a philosophy adopted
naturally by many companies. Models are increasingly being put to greater use and increasingly
being used to inform business decisions. This increase in model use is not always necessarily backed
by an increase in resource. This case study emphasises the importance of ensuring that an appro-
priate culture and mind set is maintained despite cost and time constraints.
2.1.18. Finally, another key lesson to keep in mind is the risk of becoming over-comfortable and
complacent when using models. Just before the loss of the MCO space probe, it was perceived that
“Orbiting Mars is routine” (NASA, 2000b) since the navigation of such spacecraft had been carried
out successfully for several decades. This led to insufﬁcient focus on identifying and mitigating
risks relating to spacecraft navigation. The following statement, a recommendation made by the
Investigation Board, should be kept in mind:
2.1.19. “Personnel should question and challenge everything—even those things that have always
worked”.
2.2. Cumbria Flooding (2015)
2.2.1. Background: Northwest England experienced record rainfall during 5–6 December 2015,
claiming two lives and resulting in an estimated 5,200 ﬂooded houses and £500 million of damage
across Cumbria, the worst affected area.
2.2.2. Details: Over 5,000 homes were left ﬂooded and 50,000+ left without power after Storm
Desmond wreaked havoc in parts of the United Kingdom on 5 and 6 December 2015. Storm
Desmond was an extra tropical cyclone and the fourth named storm of the 2015–2016 UK and
Ireland windstorm season. Desmond directed a plume of moist air, known as an atmospheric river,
in its wake, bringing in moist air from the Caribbean to the British Isles, and meaning that rainfall
from Desmond was unusually heavy.
2.2.3. The UK Met Ofﬁce says Honister in Cumbria received 341.4mm (13.4 inches) of rain in the
24-hour period from 18:30 GMT on Friday 4 December to 18:30 GMT on Saturday 5 December.
This was more than twice the average monthly rainfall for Cumbria in December and beat
the previous UK record set at Seathwaite, also in Cumbria, of 316.4mm (12.4inches) on
19 November 2009.
R. Black et al.
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2.2.4. The devastation resulted in criticism of the government after multimillion-pound defences built
following ﬂoods in Cumbria in 2005 failed to keep the deluge out from people’s homes. However,
Environment Agency ofﬁcials said the Cumbria ﬂood defences did work, but no matter how sub-
stantial any defences are, “you can always get water levels higher than that, in which case it will go
over the top”. The Met Ofﬁce said Storm Desmond had more impact because the “exceptional”
levels of rain fell on already saturated land.
2.2.5. On the other hand, Sandtable, a modelling consultancy, commented: “… investments in ﬂood
protection since the last major ﬂoodings in 2009 could not be expected to deal with something as
unprecedented as 300mm of rain within 24 hours because it is such a rare event (the monthly
average rainfall for Cumbria in December is 146.1mm). But it is a rare event that has happened three
times in the last 10 years” (Sandtable, 2015).
2.2.6. Considerations for actuarial models: The above statements highlight that, in the wake of such
a disaster, two alternative interpretations of events can be plausible: (a) that there was a failure of
prediction, possibly due to modelling ﬂaws; or (b) that there was no failure of prediction, but the
event that occurred was so rare that it was reasonable that no precautions to fully mitigate it were
in place.
2.2.7. In the context of extreme events, it is difﬁcult to decide which of those two interpretations
more closely reﬂects reality. Which interpretation is accepted as the dominant narrative of events
matters, as it relates to apportioning of blame: to modellers (for not predicting the event) or to
decision-makers (for not taking suitable precautions). The argument that it was reasonable to not be
fully prepared for an event that did eventually materialise is not easily accepted by the public.
2.2.8. Furthermore, the difﬁculty of communicating the risk of extreme events is highlighted in this
case study. Return periods (“1-in-200 years”) are easier to communicate than probabilities
(“probability of 1-in-200 over the next year”). However, the use of return periods implies that the
frequency of the phenomenon described is stable over time. For some things like earthquakes that
may well be true, but for pretty much anything else, including ﬁnancial markets and rainfall patterns
(in the context of climate change), it most likely is not: the language we use is not neutral, it makes
implicit epistemological assumptions.
2.2.9. Additionally, information expressed through return periods and probabilities may be
ambiguous to the public, if the reference class of probability statements is not given, that is, the
population “out of which” frequencies are evaluated (Gigerenzer & Edwards, 2003). For example, if
weather patterns were stationary, a 1-in-200 year storm at a particular location would be expected
to be exceeded with a probability of 1/200 in any given year. But there is a much higher probability
of observing such an extreme storm at some location within a given territory. The more the relevant
locations, the higher the frequency of observed “1-in-200 year” events.
2.3. Growth in a Time of Debt (2010)
2.3.1. “Growth in a Time of Debt”, by Harvard economists Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) has been a
highly inﬂuential paper, often cited by policy-makers as justiﬁcation for slashing public spending
following the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis. The paper’s commonly cited claim is that economic growth
slows dramatically when the size of a country’s debt rises above 90% of gross domestic
product (GDP).
Model risk: illuminating the black box
9
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321717000150
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 23 Oct 2017 at 14:22:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
2.3.2. The key policy question the paper attempted to answer was: Is it better to let debt increase in
the hope of stimulating economic growth to get out of a slump, or is it better to cut spending and
raise taxes aggressively to get public debt under control?
2.3.3. The paper attracted a lot of interest, including from the economics department at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts Amherst. Professors Michael Ash and Robert Pollin set a graduate student,
Thomas Herndon, the task of picking an economics paper and seeing if he could replicate the results,
framed as a good exercise for aspiring researchers.
2.3.4. Herndon’s attempts to replicate the results proved unsuccessful. After Herndon contacted the
authors, Reinhart and Rogoff provided him with the actual working spreadsheet they had used to
obtain their results. Herndon discovered a number of issues, including:
∙ the authors had accidentally only included 15 of the 20 countries under analysis in their key
calculation (having excluded Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Denmark);
∙ for some countries, some data were missing altogether; and
∙ the methodology to average out performance of countries of different sizes was called into
question. For example, 1 bad year for New Zealand, was weighted equally with the United
Kingdom, a more global economy with nearly 20 years of high public debt.
2.3.5. After correcting for the above issues, the basic conclusion that countries with indebtedness
rates above 90% of GDP have lower growth rates still held, but the most spectacular results
disappeared, the relationship was much gentler and there were numerous exceptions to the rule
(Herndon et al., 2014). These ﬁndings substantially weaken the role of Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010)
contribution to arguments in favour of adopting of austerity policies in countries with various levels
of public debt.
2.3.6. Considerations for actuarial models: The errors in the original paper by Reinhardt and Rogoff
could be classiﬁed as rather major “blunders”, which should have been discoverable even by an
elementary spreadsheet check. So the question of relevance is less how these errors were made, but
more how they found their way into the ﬁnal paper.
2.3.7. We note that Reinhart and Rogoff have made consistently the case for controlling public debt,
both before and after publication of their 2010 paper (Cassidy, 2013). While Reinhart and Rogoff
admitted (to an extent) to errors in the original paper, they were quite clear that their views of the
related policy issues have not changed. This indicates that the results of the 2010 paper were in line
with a wider set of beliefs held by the authors.
2.3.8. The importance of this is illustrated by a counterfactual. Let us assume that the spreadsheet errors
had been such that no result was found that supports the thesis of high public debt being associated with
low growth. In that case, we can reasonably speculate that the researchers would have been surprised by
the ﬁndings and may have actively looked for (and eventually discovered) the spreadsheet errors.
2.3.9. This demonstrates the wider point that model checking and validation can be heavily
inﬂuenced by prior beliefs and biases. As a result, model errors that produce results conﬁrming prior
beliefs are less likely to be discovered. Since such beliefs are often not speciﬁc to individuals,
but widely shared across expert groups and markets, we can see conﬁrmation bias as a potential
generator of systemic model risk.
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2.3.10. Furthermore, central to this case study is the reproducibility of model results and the
openness that Reinhart and Rogoff demonstrated in sharing their spreadsheets with the Amherst
researchers. It is exactly this transparency, common in some (though not all) areas of academic
research, that allowed the errors to be discovered. Such transparency is not easily attainable for
many models deployed within the ﬁnancial industry. Consequently, one can only speculate as to the
number and impact of errors that sit undetected.
2.4. Summary
2.4.1. The three case studies presented in this chapter illustrate a number of important points that
can be applied to actuarial models. From the Mars Orbiter loss we learn the value of a “challenge
everything” culture and the importance of good and timely communication especially when applied
to large modelling teams. The Cumbria ﬂooding case study shows the difﬁculty of communicating
extreme risk events to the public and defending models in light of these events. Finally, the “Growth
in a Time of Debt” case shows us the importance of independent model reviews and of providing
transparency around key assumptions and methodology.
3. Model Risk Communication
Since model risk is not as well deﬁned and established as other more traditional risks, the identiﬁ-
cation, understanding and communication of model risk is crucial. We consider here how best to
communicate to key internal stakeholders (the Board and Senior Management) and key external
stakeholders (regulators and analysts/investors). As an example, a recent paper by the Lloyd’s
Market Association (LMA) Exposure Management Working Group (2017) offers a structured way
of explaining model risk in practical circumstances to a Board-level audience, in that case offering
examples of catastrophe modellers working in the Lloyd’s market.
3.1. Internal Stakeholders
3.1.1. Overall responsibility for managing model risk must lie with the Board (or equivalent). This is
because model risk events can impact the ﬁnancial strength of the company and because the Board is
ultimately responsible for the results and decisions of the organisation which are built upon,
potentially, multiple layers of models.
3.1.2. It is therefore important that members of the Board, and where applicable the Risk and Audit
Committees, are presented with clear, succinct information on model risk which enables them to
understand how well model risk is being managed by the organisation and the key model risks of which
they should be aware, as well as any actions that are being taken or proposed in order to restore model
risk exposures to positions with which the Board is comfortable (within the Board’s risk appetite).
3.1.3. In particular, we would expect communications to these internal stakeholders to cover:
∙ any breaches of model risk appetite limits, and high-level commentary on the causes of the breach
(es) and the path and timeline to return to within appetite;
∙ any key High risk model limitations or weaknesses in model risk governance, identiﬁed by the ﬁrst
(Model Owners), second (model reviewers) or third (internal audit) lines of defence, and how they
may impact the respective results; and
∙ any key model risks associated with regulatory, market or internal developments.
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3.1.4. For the next level down (e.g. for sub-committees or accountable individuals responsible for
model risk management), more granular MI on model risk should be presented to enable the indi-
vidual, or body, to manage all aspects of model risk. We would therefore expect communications to
these internal stakeholders to cover:
∙ the organisation’s overall model risk proﬁle compared with its agreed appetite;
∙ any proposed management actions to be taken where necessary to manage the company’s model
risk within appetite;
∙ key model developments in progress or recently completed;
∙ outcomes of recent model validations, reviews or audits, highlighting any medium or high risk
issues or areas of weakness identiﬁed;
∙ actions being taken by management to address these issues, along with associated timelines and
progress to date;
∙ any breaches of Model Risk Policy or non-compliance with modelling standards, and associated
timelines to remediate; and
∙ any emerging model risks, whether associated with regulatory, market or other internal
developments.
3.1.5. In addition, speciﬁc deep-dives on material models may be appropriate, covering:
∙ scope and purpose of model;
∙ ﬁtness for purpose of model;
∙ key model limitations/ﬁndings;
∙ key expert judgements/assumptions underlying the model, and sensitivities to these judgements;
∙ extent of review/challenge/validation of the model; and
∙ quality of data underlying the model.
3.1.6. This will allow the individual or body to more holistically understand the nature of and risks
associated with each of the key models, and to be able to opine and challenge more robustly in order
to effectively meet their responsibilities.
3.2. External Stakeholders
3.2.1. There are two key groups of external stakeholders to which to consider communicating on
model risk – regulators and analysts/investors.
3.2.2. Communicating to external stakeholders brings challenges. Internal stakeholders are a known
quantity, and will have an understanding of the background and context of the model risks of the
business. Regulators will also have a degree of understanding of the context and of the topic of
model risk and industry issues; however, other external audiences will have an unknown range of
purposes, expertise and cultures.
3.2.3. Furthermore, given the level of challenge and the potential downside, the ﬁrst consideration is
whether we should communicate anything on model risk at all? After all, if the model has been
through internal scrutiny it could be argued that the risk is sufﬁciently minimised, mitigated or
managed.
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3.2.4. However, without knowledge of the purpose of the recipient it is hard to make the call on their
behalf that what is accepted internally as an acceptable level of risk is still acceptable to them, given
their potentially different context and criteria.
3.2.5. This leads us on to explore further the types of recipient and the purposes for which an
institution’s modelling may be important.
3.2.6. To whom are we communicating externally on model risk?: For any institution, in addition to
regulators, investors are likely to be the primary external parties with which we are concerned. The
security of ﬁnancial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, is inherently reliant on their
balance sheets which, in turn, rely upon the veracity of the underlying models. When deciding whether to
invest it is reasonable that a potential investor should have some knowledge of the reliance on particular
modelling decisions. For example, should a different model turn out to have been more appropriate
would this have made a signiﬁcant difference to the investment decision or made very little change?
3.2.7. Investors may rely upon comment from other parties such as analysts, journalists or ratings agencies.
For such comment and analysis to be informed and useful, particularly in carrying out comparisons
between different organisations, it is important to understand whether the institution’s results are stable
whatever model is used or whether they could vary signiﬁcantly or contain some heroic assumptions.
3.2.8. Clients, customers, suppliers, etc. are also likely to all be concerned with the ﬁnancial strength
of an institution and the level to which this strength is built on ﬁrm foundations, or is impacted by
modelling decisions.
3.2.9. There may also be other parties who are making decisions impacted by the model outcomes.
3.2.10. Thus the authors are of the view that it is necessary to convey a sense of the risk inherent in the
modelling. However, detailed checks and tests carried out on the models, which may be relevant for
internal or regulator communications, would not be possible or appropriate. Finding the balance is key.
3.2.11. What do we need to communicate externally on model risk?: When communicating exter-
nally it is generally not likely to be appropriate to use the same approach as for internal commu-
nications on model risk. There should be more focus on the company’s model risk management
practices, and particularly for communications to investors/analysts we need to convey the infor-
mation in a more succinct, less technical manner.
3.2.12. For regulators and investors, the key questions we expect they will be asking, particularly as
model risk continues to grow in proﬁle, are as follows:
∙ Does the ﬁrm have a well-understood deﬁnition of model risk? Does this have broader reach than
just the modelling department?
∙ Does model risk have prominence with the Board? Is it a principal risk? Is it included in the
Board’s risk appetite?
∙ Does consideration of model risk feed into decision-making in an appropriate way?
∙ Does the ﬁrm apply sufﬁcient resources, tools and independence to modelling and the assessment
of model risk? and
∙ Ultimately, how much reliance can be placed on the ﬁrm’s published results, and how much could
these reasonably be over or understated?
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3.2.13. We therefore expect that external communication on model risk should directly address these
questions.
3.2.14. How should we communicate externally on model risk?: The Own Risk and Solvency
Assessment or equivalent, the Annual Report and Accounts, the Solvency and Financial Condition
Report and the Regular Supervisory Report, are the primary external documents. These contain
information on the principal risks intrinsic in the business. Historically model risk was seen as one of
many operational risks. However, we would argue model risk is wider than just the risk of
accidentally using wrong parameters. As such, we would now expect to see speciﬁc consideration of
model risk, which, at the least, would conﬁrm that processes have been undergone to ensure the
model is appropriate and applied correctly, and that this has been veriﬁed by senior responsible
individuals other than the Model Owner.
3.2.15. For some institutions model risk will be sizeable enough to be a principal risk in its own right,
for others it will remain a subset of another risk such as operational risk or governance risk, albeit
with more prominence.
3.2.16. As the documentation gets more detailed so the granularity on model risk should follow. For
example, a bondholder’s prospectus might be expected to contain more detail on model risk than the
Annual Report and Accounts.
3.2.17. Why should we communicate externally on model risk?: The concern to date with com-
municating externally on model risk is that it could carry more downside risk than upside. Because
we cannot properly communicate the uncertainty inherent in the models, does it give a false sense of
security? Can it leave the Company unreasonably exposed when things go wrong?
3.2.18. However, this is not different from most other risk types, and ultimately good commu-
nication adds value and promotes conﬁdence; particularly as model risk events become more pre-
valent in the media and because model risk relates directly to the results on which regulators and
investors rely. This may give an institution competitive advantage. It also makes comparisons against
others easier and more valid. And, ultimately, as it becomes industry standard practice to commu-
nicate on model risk management the recipients will start to expect the information.
3.2.19. Overall, it is the view of the authors that there is a need for more disclosure on model risk, both
to regulators and publicly, as the proﬁle and level of understanding of model risk as a risk type is
increasing, as is the complexity and importance of actuarial models. It is also valuable to highlight the risk
management practices in place around actuarial models as these are in general strong relative to model
risk management in many other ﬁelds, due to disciplines instilled through a combination of actuarial
standards and regulations such as Solvency II. However, there needs to be additional care when making
disclosures around model risk to explain their context, given that precedents at this stage are still limited.
4. Practical Implementation of a Model Risk Management Framework
The concept of a Model Risk Management Framework was developed in the Phase 1 paper;
subsequent feedback challenged how this can be implemented in a practical and proportionate
manner. Appendix of this paper therefore sets out a full example Model Risk Policy to implement a
Model Risk Management Framework; in this section we focus on speciﬁc key aspects of the
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framework which merit fuller explanation. There are similar remarks made in the recent
Macpherson Report (HM Treasury, 2013) which we recommend to the reader. That paper reviews
the quality assurance of UK Government analytical models and makes recommendations and best
practice guidelines with the objective of ensuring all models are of sufﬁciently high quality, and that
their end users – Ministers and, ultimately, the public – can place their trust in them.
4.1. Central Inventory of Core Models
4.1.1. As deﬁned by the Federal Reserve in section 1.1.3, the term model refers to a quantitative
method, system or approach that applies statistical, economic, ﬁnancial or mathematical theories,
techniques and assumptions to process input data into quantitative estimates of outcomes or
behaviours which are used for a particular business purpose. Models typically rely on approxima-
tions, simpliﬁcations and judgements to represent a more complex reality.
4.1.2. This said, we recognise that any large business, especially in ﬁnancial services, typically has a
great number of “models” that are often much simpler and do not meet the deﬁnition above
especially by involving little judgement. Such “calculator” models might include, for example, those
used for data manipulation (data in are manipulated to data out by following robust and pre-deﬁned
rules) or well-deﬁned validation checks which aggregate and summarise data for review.
4.1.3. Model risk for these models can be greatly reduced through appropriate processes and controls.
For example: testing the code before release; version controlling the production versions of each models
and ensuring staff only use the most up-to-date version; maintaining detailed documentation around
each model from the perspective of both developers and users; analysis of the model results using rules-
of-thumb; and checking integrity and reasonableness of model inputs and outputs.
4.1.4. For the smaller subset of models within an organisation that do genuinely meet the deﬁnition
of section 1.1.3, the authors recommend the maintenance of a central inventory, maintained at either
a department or business unit level, or at a global level across a company’s entire operation. The
inventory should be kept up-to-date, for example, in sync with the reporting cycle, and for good
practice might contain the following for each model:
∙ model’s name and version number ideally with a unique reference number;
∙ drive location;
∙ Model Owner/team responsible for model;
∙ a categorisation of the model (see section 4.6) into High/Medium/Basic control risk;
∙ when model was last reviewed and by whom;
∙ link to user documentation;
∙ link to model testing documentation;
∙ link to model speciﬁcation documentation; and
∙ link to model methodology/appropriateness review notes and who conducted the review.
4.1.5. Such information might be time-consuming to obtain, but once a model inventory has been
created maintenance of it should become a straightforward exercise. Moreover, the inventory will
then continue to provide management with an at-a-glance view of all “live” models in use in their
organisation, with key audit information, and ranked by risk materiality.
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4.2. Assigning Key Model Roles
4.2.1. Once models have been identiﬁed, the most important step is to assign the key roles around
each model. The need to put speciﬁc named people in these roles is heightened by the introduction in
the United Kingdom of the Senior Insurance Managers’ Regime in March 2016 which requires
named individuals to be accountable for key models (Table 1).
4.2.2. The Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) introduced the Senior
Managers and Certiﬁcation Regime (SMR) for banking and the Senior Insurance Managers Regime
(SIMR) on 7 March 2016. There is a proposal to introduce this for all FSMA (Financial Services and
Markets Act 2010) authorised ﬁrms during 2018. SMR/SIMR focusses on the most senior individuals in
ﬁrms who hold key roles or have overall responsibility for whole areas of relevant ﬁrms and reinforces the
importance of individual accountability at the most senior level of organisations (see https://www.fca.org.
uk/ﬁrms/senior-managers-certiﬁcation-regime).
Table 1. Key Model Roles and Responsibilities
Roles Main Responsibilities Main Risks/Mitigating Actions
Chief Risk
Ofﬁcers
Ensuring that all models used by their legal
entity are identiﬁed and recorded in the
model inventory, and have Key Model
Roles assigned
Complete, consistent and timely completion
of model inventories across business
organisation
Gaining agreement on Model Owners
Model user Model being used appropriately and only
using the model after approval by the
Model Approver
Training and adequate documentation of
modelling process, using approved signed-
off model, reducing key person
dependencies
Model Owner(s) Maintenance of information in model
inventory system, model risk prioritisation,
compliance with model risk control
standards, sign-off of model developments
and changes, model monitoring, liaising
with the Model Reviewer and Auditors
Ensuring model entries in model inventory are
accurate and up-to-date. Following the
established model change and model sign
off process, maintaining model
documentation
Needs to be someone with sufﬁcient authority/
seniority to command
resources required to meet expected
standards
Model reviewer Performing independent validation and
reviews of models
Technical competence to perform model
review, access to key staff involved in model
development
Model approver Reviewing residual risk assessments and
approving the use (or limited use) of the
model
Approval becomes difﬁcult if there are many
models at various stages of change
Similarly, in many instances not approving a
model for use is not always feasible
Internal auditor Checking due process has been followed
when using models
On-time completion of process checklists,
adequate commentary around results, audit
trails of model inputs and outputs
External auditor Independent review of process, methodology,
assumptions, limitations, results
On-time completion of process checklists,
adequate justiﬁcation of key expert
judgements, commentary around results,
audit trails of model inputs and outputs.
Focus on exceptions and deviation from
established process
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4.2.3. As part of SMR, ﬁrms need to:
∙ ensure each Senior Manager has a Statement of Responsibilities setting out the areas for which
they are personally accountable; and
∙ produce a Firm Responsibilities Map that knits these together.
4.2.4. We expect that any such Statement of Responsibilities must include those models within the
business unit for which the Senior Manager has responsibility.
4.2.5. Furthermore, we would expect the Key Model Roles to potentially align to SMR/SIMR roles.
4.3. Third Party Software
4.3.1. Discussions in this paper so far have focussed on those models for which the user has sole
responsibility, either as the model developer, or as the user of a model that has been developed in-
house. However, many modelling suites are reliant on core software and models provided by third
parties. For example, most UK life insurers use the same well-known provider for the economic
scenario generators (ESGs) that drive their stochastic modelling. Similarly, software from external
providers is frequently used to value derivatives and other exotic instruments for asset modelling,
and for investment portfolio risk analysis/management.
4.3.2. The working party submits that a third party software provider is akin to “another team, in a
separate room” – integral to the success of our business but working remotely from it. As such, all
the standards that we hold our own modelling to must equally apply to any third party software that
we use – or else we are explicitly acknowledging an unacceptable “weakest link” in our Model Risk
Management Framework.
4.3.3. The following advice is given for management of all third party software:
∙ Ensure you have done enough due diligence. Is the third party software you are using really
appropriate for the task and how have you gained comfort with this decision? A consensus view
should be established before software is installed and incorporate into your modelling suite.
∙ Record all third party software alongside your regular models in your central inventory – with the
same triage categories of High/Medium/Basic risk.
∙ Ensure that there are personnel in your organisation with sufﬁcient knowledge to use and, where
required, parametrise the software appropriately. Further, can you challenge the assumptions and
methodology in sufﬁcient depth that any limitations can be communicated as they would be with
an in-house model?
∙ Keep your versions of third party software up-to-date unless there is good reason not to do so.
This can often drive your in-house model development cycle, with software lifetimes and support
being communicated months and years ahead. (As an example: 90% of UK National Health
Service (NHS) Trusts are still using Windows XP despite Microsoft having withdrawn support for
this version in April 2014 (Inquirer, 2016).) (This comment was made before the high-proﬁle
ransomware cyberattacks on the NHS and other global organisations in May 2017.)
4.3.4. Before a new version of any third party software is installed, ensure rigourous user acceptance
testing (UAT) has been carried out. Are results expected to stay the same? If not, are they expected to
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change and do they by an acceptable amount. Record UAT tests and outcomes as you would for
your own models.
4.3.5. Insist on sufﬁcient and up-to-date user documentation. For technical models, ask for white
papers to enable personnel to gain a solid understanding of what is “under the bonnet”.
4.4. Independent Review and Frequency
4.4.1. Models with a “High” control level, as deﬁned in section 4.6, are likely to be ones which
would have a large ﬁnancial impact if they are materially “wrong” or used inappropriately,
or which are complex and/or involve a signiﬁcant amount of judgement in assumptions or
methodology.
4.4.2. For these models, we recommend a systematic programme of independent review, as is now
standard in the banking industry following the ﬁnancial crisis. Throughout this paper, whenever we
refer to validation, we mean independent validation by people who have no involvement in the
design and operations of the particular model being validated. The frequency of review will be at
management’s discretion but we suggest as a minimum each High risk model being reviewed at least
once every 3 years on a rolling basis.
4.4.3. All reviews should be evidenced and recorded in the central inventory (see section 4.1.4)
alongside the model being reviewed. We suggest reviews should cover the following:
∙ Model review date; the model and version being reviewed as shown in the inventory.
∙ Is it clear what is the purpose of the model, and has it been used for that purpose?
∙ Review of model user documentation to ensure its adequacy and a judgement made on whether it
could be followed by a “technically competent third party”.
∙ Is there clarity around all model inputs and outputs, and the key judgements used in the model?
∙ Is there evidence of requirements and testing documentation, and recent model sign-off?
∙ Based on the above, are there any action points that should implemented and, if so, is there an
agreed date for their completion?
4.4.4. It is our view that such review evidence, if maintained regularly and held alongside the
central inventory, will serve to greatly reduce model risk around an organisation’s key High risk
models.
4.5. The culture challenge
4.5.1. Developing, testing and running models, as well as using their outputs in decision-making, are
complex endeavours that can involve many different participants across an organisation. As such, we
must recognise that a company’s culture plays an important part in the ways model risk emerges and
the ways it can be managed.
4.5.2. As reviewed in section 1, the Phase I Model Risk Working Party Report (Aggarwal et al.,
2016) argued that successful model governance is reliant on representing and addressing the
concerns of different professional cultures within the organisation, with potentially conﬂicting
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perceptions of models. Here we outline some of the practical challenges that model governance faces.
They revolve around:
∙ opening up the model to a wider set of stakeholders;
∙ social pressures relating to the difﬁculty of expressing dissenting views; and
∙ balancing model change and innovation.
4.5.3. Opening up the model: The complexity of some models can lead to a lot of power resting in
the hands of experienced developers and technical experts, with models seen as black boxes by other
stakeholders. This means that there may be insufﬁcient opportunity for the technical judgements
made to be challenged by a wider set of experts, such as model users and the Board. An obvious risk
is that substantial weaknesses in a model may remain unidentiﬁed.
4.5.4. Key person dependencies, especially if adequate technical and user model documentation are
lacking, is a related source of risk.
4.5.5. The lack of opportunities to challenge and discuss a model’s structure, assumptions and
output, can also prevent the building of conﬁdence in the model. Model users often ﬁnd it hard to
trust the output of black boxes. As a result, the lack of wider challenge can lead to a very different
type of risk: that a good model is insufﬁciently deployed and the insights it may provide are
passed by.
4.5.6. The above risks can be mitigated by making a model’s methodology and key judgements as
transparent as possible – with parallels to good and timely communication and collective account-
ability for models and their appropriate use, as described in the NASA satellite example in
section 2.1.
4.5.7. In practice, it is not possible to “open” the full model speciﬁcation for debate – apart from
constraints on people’s time, some aspects may be too technical and others too uncontroversial to
merit wider challenge. Therefore, it is important to decide what are the key judgements that need
wider discussion. The Model Risk Triage discussed in section 4.6 can be a useful tool for that
purpose.
4.5.8. Social pressures: Another issue arises when arguments highlighting the ﬂaws or limitations of a
model are not welcome within the organisation. For example, if regulatory approval of a model has
substantial economic implications, arguments that may be seen to undermine the chances of such
approval may be seen as damaging to the company’s interests.
4.5.9. Technical experts can experience conﬂicting incentives. On the one hand, in-depth under-
standing of their models means that they can be the people most capable of identifying limitations.
On the other hand, technical experts often play a leading role in championing model use within their
organisations. This means that technical experts may have an incentive to self-censor when com-
municating limitations of a model.
4.5.10. Model limitations often arise from deep uncertainties that cannot be easily quantiﬁed
(let alone resolved) through statistical modelling. At the same time, model users and Boards can
sometimes appear disinterested in hearing about these uncertainties. This may also relate to the
inability of companies to operationalise such information. Risk quantiﬁcation, as performed with the
Model risk: illuminating the black box
19
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321717000150
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 23 Oct 2017 at 14:22:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
aid of actuarial models, routinely informs decisions. But there is typically no process for translating
insights about the impact of uncertainty on model outputs into meaningful action.
4.5.11. Social pressures also manifest themselves in problems of group-think and herding.
Most actuaries and other ﬁnance professionals follow very similar education and training paths.
Furthermore, the dissemination of “best practices”, through formal and informal channels, means
that the ways of approaching modelling problems can be very similar across professionals and
companies.
4.5.12. This is compounded by the use of proprietary models, such as catastrophe models, ESGs, or
investment portfolio risk models, and perceived external pressures towards conformity of modelling
approaches across the market. The strength of this perception manifests itself in the marketing
materials of model vendors. For example, a promotional brochure for Moody’s ESG contains the
quotation: “If an insurer tells its regulator that it’s using the [Moody’s] ESG, that would probably
mean only one meeting. If the insurer says that it’s going for a less widely used ESG that might mean
seven meetings” (Moody’s Analytics, 2014).
4.5.13. There are systemic risk implications to the social pressures discussed above. First, if technical
experts are wrong about a particular modelling aspect, they are likely to be wrong in the same way.
Second, coordinated behaviour across the market, facilitated by the use of similar models can have
an impact on market conditions and structure. Thus, the act of measuring risk changes the very
nature of the risk being measured: systemic risk arises endogenously (Danielsson & Shin, 2003).
4.5.14. It is not easy to mitigate such risks. At the organisational level, we would expect documented
evidence of peer review of key judgements and methodology – with challenge – to be evidenced on a
rolling basis, for example, by realising the independent review framework described in section 4.4.
The broader challenge, not speciﬁc to model risk management, is to maintain a culture that
encourages the expression of substantiated dissent and does not seek to suppress discomﬁting views.
4.5.15. Addressing model risk at a market level is even harder and certainly beyond the reach of any
individual company. We would hope that key stakeholders, such as regulators, do not provide
incentives for further homogenisation of modelling approaches across the market.
4.5.16. Balancing model change and innovation: Insurance processes have to a great degree changed
to meet Solvency II reporting timescales. This has also affected the modelling development lifecycle.
To meet more rigourous control standards, models can now only be changed following an agreed
and resourced development pipeline.
4.5.17. This sometimes conﬂicts with the urge of well-meaning developers, who, brought up in a
culture of “Agile” development, might be tempted to proceed with what they see as small but
necessary changes (“ﬁxing a bug”), without going through a formal process. More broadly, the
need to follow time-consuming processes for approving and reporting model changes can lead to
disincentives for model improvement.
4.5.18. We counter that there must be scope in development plans to achieve the same outcomes of
continual improvement, while making all model changes visible to all model users. If model risk
management processes in practice undermine necessary model improvement, they cannot be judged
successful.
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4.6. Model Risk Assessment/Quantification
4.6.1. The model risk management effort should be proportionate to the risk a model poses. It is easy
to warn against under-investment in model risk management, leaving a ﬁrm exposed to the risk of
ﬁnancial and reputational losses; on the ﬂip side, it is also possible to over-invest in model risk
controls, with beneﬁts, in terms of reducing model risk, that are limited and/or hard to measure.
4.6.2. The aim of triage is to assess/quantify the risk associated with models, as well as material
components of those models.
4.6.3. The materiality of model risk is a function of the uncertainty in the model (i.e. likelihood of
error) and the resulting monetary/reputational impact (i.e. severity). Materiality can be assessed with
various degrees of accuracy and effort depending on the level of data available. It is worth bearing in
mind that part of the purpose of triage is to reduce the amount of effort for the less material models.
Typical data sources are:
∙ Meta data – model attributes that are known before the model is run (e.g. purpose, methodology,
number of developers, etc.);
∙ Scheduled run data – information from model runs already executed for a purpose different to
model risk management; and
∙ Test run data – information from model runs executed speciﬁcally for the purpose of model risk
management.
Meta data Scheduled
run data Test run data 
Increased triage accuracy but increased effort
4.6.4. Meta data: In terms of availability and effort required, model meta data provide a reasonably
straightforward way to determine the risk associated with a model. These model attributes should
usually be accessible and should be stored as part of the central model inventory.
4.6.5. Good meta data act as proxies to the likelihood of model error. A non-exhaustive list of
examples, categorised under each stage in a model lifecycle, is provided in Table 2.
4.6.6. Each attribute and/or a combination of attributes can be scored based on pre-deﬁned rules. An
extreme example of a “High” control level model would be one that uses “cutting-edge” metho-
dology and has only one in-house developer. The rules should ensure that the number of models in
each control level classiﬁcation is appropriate and aligns to available resource.
4.6.7. If a sizeable inventory of manually classiﬁed models (based on expert judgement) is available,
supervised machine learning technique(s) can be used to formalise and/or check the classiﬁcation
rules. An illustrative classiﬁcation (“High”, “Medium”, “Basic”) ﬂowchart generated using the
“Decision Tree” method is provided in Figure 3. Once trained and validated,1 such a model can
automate the classiﬁcation of new or other models in the inventory.
4.6.8. Scheduled run data: Scheduled run data comes from model information available for a pur-
pose different to model risk management, such as a business application. This typically includes
1 The training and validation of such a classiﬁcation model is out of the scope of this paper.
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input data and output data, perhaps under a variety of scenarios. Scheduled run data should be easy
to access but it is not usually stored within the model inventory.
4.6.9. The periodical analysis of change carried out to attribute the movement in published income
or balance sheet items (e.g. European Embedded Value, Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR), etc.) is
an obvious source of scheduled run data. Movements due to “model restatements” or “out-of-model
adjustments” would provide a monetary amount to quantify the materiality of model risk. A risk
level classiﬁcation can then be assigned based on pre-deﬁned thresholds.
4.6.10. Quantitative triage techniques that rely only on other scheduled run data include:
∙ back-testing; and
∙ reverse sensitivity testing
Table 2. Meta Data as a Proxy for Likelihood of Model Error.
Design Stage Development Stage Deployment Stage
Purpose, e.g. strategic/regulatory/forecasting/trading/
administration
Methodology, e.g. dictated by regulation/standard
industry practice/adaptation of peer-reviewed
method/cutting-edge
Number of people in the team/organisation familiar
with the methodology
Developer type, e.g. third party
vendor/in-house
Number of developers (i.e. key
man risk)
Platform, e.g. Excel/Prophet/R/
Python/.NET
Automated regression testing
Code coverage, i.e. the degree to
which the code of a model is
executed
Automated version control
system, e.g. Git/Mercurial
Number of approved/
trained users
Model
interdependencies
Period since last review/
validation
Number of restatements
to published model
result
Figure 3. Visualisation of model classiﬁcation rules
R. Black et al.
22
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321717000150
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 23 Oct 2017 at 14:22:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
4.6.11. Back-testing: In the context of predictive/forecast models, model output can be compared to
the actual historical outcome; the divergence between the two provides an estimate of the likelihood
of model error.
4.6.12. However, it should be noted that the past may not be representative of the future especially if
the model is concerned with rare events. To complement the back-testing result, the model could be
calibrated and tested against artiﬁcial data generated by known processes (see section 4.6.30 for
“Ersatz model test”).
4.6.13. Reverse sensitivity testing: In models that use Monte-Carlo simulation, pseudo-random
scenarios are generated from a number of risk factors and are subsequently fed into an aggregation
function that may represent, for example, a portfolio structure. The output of the aggregation
function consists of a large number of random scenarios pertaining to a variable of interest, for
example, Net Asset Value. Repeated evaluations of the aggregation function for each scenario can be
computationally expensive, which is the reason behind the long runtimes of Monte-Carlo models
such as ones used in some SCR calculations.
4.6.14. The reverse sensitivity testing method (Pesenti et al., 2017) employs ideas from importance
sampling, to re-weight scenarios in order to stress the distribution of inputs or outputs. Such re-weighting
allows the exploration of the alternative model speciﬁcations from a scheduled model run, without the
need to generate new scenarios and evaluate the aggregation function again.
4.6.15. As an example, consider a simpliﬁed insurance risk model with four input risk factors (X1,
X2, X3 and X4). A re-weighting scheme is devised such that the 90%-value at risk of the output is
scaled up by 20%. Distributions derived with those weights correspond to a stressed model. Figure 4
shows the percentile functions of the four risk factors, according to the baseline model (in black) and
the stressed model (in red).2
4.6.16. Where there is a substantial difference between the input distributions under the baseline and
stressed models (as is the case here for the ﬁrst and fourth risk factors), a high sensitivity to inputs is
indicated. When there is also uncertainty around the distribution of those same inputs, a cause for
concern can be ﬂagged. By using statistical deviation measures to quantify such differences between
distributions, the numbers of ﬂags raised for a particular model can be used as a metric for model
risk management.
4.6.17. Test run data: Test run data is model information created speciﬁcally for the purpose of
model risk management. This data should be available as part of model implementation and testing.
4.6.18. Sensitivity tests requiring test runs are typically performed by varying a particular aspect of
the model and analysing the resulting change in model output. Without employing more advanced
methods, each sensitivity test requires a separate model test run. Sensitivity tests may be derived from
varying estimated model parameters or changes in methodology.
4.6.19. Sensitivity to estimated parameters can provide a measure of the potential impact of
statistical uncertainty on the model output. If changes in a parameter, for example, a volatility or a
2 An interactive application demonstrating this example can be found at https://tsanak.shinyapps.io/
sensitivitydemo/ (accessed 31 May 2017).
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correlation coefﬁcient, lead to substantial changes in output and if, additionally, the parameter is
subject to high estimation error, then an area of model risk is indicated.
4.6.20. In practice, there are several challenges with the above approach:
∙ First, one needs to decide the extent to which parameters should be changed in sensitivity tests.
This should reﬂect statistical uncertainty, for example, by setting parameters to their conﬁdence
limits.
∙ Second, one has to decide whether parameters will be varied one at a time or all at once. The latter
approach may be too conservative, but reﬂects situations where parameters are set using consistent
expert judgements.
∙ Third, it remains a challenge to derive clear conclusions from the data that such exercises produce.
For example, many insurers observe that increasing correlations between risk factors can lead to
large changes in SCR. This observation on its own does not indicate a meaningful course of model
risk mitigation.
4.6.21. Where alternative methodological choices to those employed in a model are plausible, the
impact of method changes on model outputs can also be tested. In some cases that is relatively
straightforward to implement, for example, when changing the family of distribution for a risk factor
(e.g. from Gamma to LogNormal). However, other methodological changes (e.g. a change in
dependence structure or valuation method) are too time-consuming to implement for test purposes.
One needs to remain mindful that the methodological choices made are often subject to contingent
factors such as modelling legacy or software capabilities.
4.6.22. Types of error to test: When attempting to classify models according to their risks, it must be
recognised that an attempt at modelling could fail for several different classes of reasons. A model
could be rated as high risk at the triage stage for several different reasons.
4.6.23. Conceptually, the simplest type of model errors are the typographical errors, programming
bugs or formula mistakes which should, in principle, be detectable by expert inspection of a model’s
internal formulas. We refer to these human errors as blunders.
Figure 4. Visualisation of reverse sensitivity testing for an illustrative example
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4.6.24. Next to these errors are those arising from various forms of statistical uncertainty. These
include uncertainties in models and parameters because of data being limited. An example of this is
the peso effect (which actuaries sometimes call Events not in Data), where a rare event such as peso
devaluation is over-represented if it occurs in the analysed data and under-represented if it does not.
4.6.25. There are also errors associated with broader, non-statistical uncertainties, such as whether
the data are accurate, whether favourable points have been cherry picked or arbitrary points have
been censored.
4.6.26. A further source of errors can arise when some problem aspects are not captured either in the
ﬁtted model or in the reference model. For example, ﬁnancial models may treat market prices as
statistical processes unaffected by the decisions to be taken, when in reality a ﬁrm’s decision to buy
or sell an asset might change the market price of that asset. Behaviour of customers or competitors
may be described statistically when in fact a part of those behaviours is a response to a ﬁrm’s own
strategy. Part of model triage should then consider whether a model has overlooked material
feedback loops.
4.6.27. Ersatz Model tests: The idea of model triage is to classify models according to their level of
risk while controlling the cost of performing the classiﬁcation. Subsequent review and validation are
then more intensive but applied only to the depth required by the triage stage.
4.6.28. As technology and model governance processes continue to develop, ﬁrms are able to
automate more of what is currently classiﬁed as validation and review. This reduces the cost of those
activities, potentially allowing some of them to fall in future within the triage stage.
4.6.29. The automation of model runs potentially allows models to be tested not just on data stressed
in one direction, but rather on large numbers of randomly generated data sets. On each of those
randomly generated datasets, model parameters are estimated and, subsequently, model outputs are
evaluated. For this to work, the precise data input format needs to be speciﬁed, and also a reference
method for generating the random data. The Ersatz test measures how well the model output
replicates the reference process that generated the data, in a suitably deﬁned average sense across
multiple simulated data sets.
4.6.30. Ersatz tests are a straightforward way for detecting material model blunders. A model based
on a stated set of assumptions should at least perform according to its speciﬁcation if the reference
method produces data conﬁrming to those assumptions. Where even those tests fails, a logical or
programming error is the likely culprit.
4.6.31. Ersatz tests can also give valuable insights into model limitations. They can highlight the
characteristics of reference data sets which the model does and does not capture. Ersatz tests can also
reveal the amount of statistical variability that can be expected in model output as a consequence of
the ﬁniteness of data. The materiality of both these sources of uncertainty can be factored into a
triage process.
4.6.32. Some manual processes are more amenable than others to automation. A particular hurdle is
automating human judgement. While a one-off instance of a model may reﬂect judgement applied to
the actual data set, the execution of Ersatz tests requires a formulation for how that judgement
would be applied to arbitrary input data. It is possible that judgement that seems reasonable applied
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to real data could fail an Ersatz test on generated data. In this way, an Ersatz test may also highlight
the consequences of systematically selecting favourable points. It may also be that the process of
judgement capture highlights a previously undetected human bias and a ﬁrm decides to address the
data collection bias rather than reporting a test fail.
5. Model Risk: Lessons Learned From Other Industries
There are many industries that use models to help with their decision-making, not just ﬁnancial
services. This section presents views from other industries gleaned by on-site interviews or from the
contributors’ personal work experiences.
5.1. Weather Forecasting
5.1.1. On 6 January 2017 this year, Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of England,
famously likened the collective failure to predict the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crash to what he called a
“‘Michael Fish moment for economists” (BBC, 2017). To his eternal chagrin, Michael Fish was
unfortunate enough to have been on duty as the BBC evening Met Ofﬁce weather forecaster a few
hours ahead of a most dramatic storm event over the southern United Kingdom in October 1987.
Haldane’s jibe seems altogether inauspicious for us, as we look to the meteorological and
environmental sectors for some lessons to be learned for our immediate needs in the insurance,
ﬁnance and banking sectors.
5.1.2. And yet, as it happens, in March of just the previous year (1986), the Royal Society and British
Academy had convened a joint Symposium on “Predictability in Science and Society” (Mason et al.,
1986). It covered the gamut of disciplines, from “Historical Inevitability and Human Agency in
Marxism” (Cohen, 1986) to “The Recently Recognized Failure of Predictability in Newtonian
Dynamics” (Lighthill, 1986) – and a good deal in between, including “Predictability and Economic
Theory” (Sen, 1986), “Application of Control Theory to Macro-economic Models” (Westcott,
1986) and “The Interpretation and Use of Economic Predictions” (Burns, 1986). Unsurprisingly, Sir
John Mason (sometime Director of the Met Ofﬁce) contributed a paper on “Numerical Weather
Prediction” (NWP). Signiﬁcantly, it provides insights into how the use of models in weather fore-
casting had enabled these forecasts to be improved markedly since the 1960s. In addition, it sets out
some principles for gauging and tracking forecasting “skill”, and which principles are still in place.
5.1.3.Making progress: Already in 1986, Mason was able to report on signiﬁcant progress since the
1960s in NWP. Important for present purposes, some of the progress Mason records is charted in
terms of a measure referred to as skill. Thus, we have this:
Although RMS [root mean square] errors and correlation coefﬁcients are useful indicators of
the performance of different models for the same area and period, they are only partial
indicators of the model’s predictive skill. A better judgement is obtained by comparing the
forecasts RMS errors with the long-term climatological variance or with the errors of a
persistence (zero-skill) forecast based on persistence (no change) from the initial conditions
(Mason, 1986, page 53).
5.1.4. In other words, progress can be gauged according to the improvement in, say, the root mean
square (RMS) error of the given forecast relative to that of the naïve forecast of tomorrow’s weather
being the same as today’s – that most rudimentary of straight-line, indeed horizontal, extrapolations.
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In 1984, certain features of the 72-hour-ahead forecast showed RMS errors at just 48% of the naïve
(persistence) forecast. These errors had been at the level of 80% 10 years previously. Errors at that
80% level in 1984 were not reached until the 6-day-ahead forecast, “suggesting a gain of three days
in predictive skill” (Mason, 1986, page 53).
5.1.5. What lay behind such progress? Unsurprisingly, it was investment in computing power and
model “complexity”. A 10-level northern-hemisphere model had been introduced in 1972 and a
15-level global model in 1982. RMS errors were roughly halved over 1972–1984. 72-hour-ahead
forecasts in 1986 were as good as the 48-hour forecasts had been 7 years previously and 48-hour-
ahead forecasts as good as the previous 24-hour-ahead forecasts.
5.1.6. Mason proceeds to observe that:
Numerical forecasts are unlikely to provide good or useful guidance for the issue of surface
weather forecasts if the RMS error exceeds 75% of the persistence error (Mason, 1986, page 54).
5.1.7. From this he goes on to address the matter of the scope for improvements in predictive skill,
from which (on the basis of a hypothetical, simulated case study) he concludes:
These ﬁgures [numerical details of forecast persistence errors and skill from the case study]
suggest that it will, in general, be very difﬁcult to produce useful deterministic forecasts of
synoptic-scale developments for more than 14 days ahead … (Mason, 1986, page 58).
5.1.8. Yet the 1986 Symposium was about Predictability (and the “failure of predictability in
Newtonian dynamics”, as Lighthill (1986) put it). Thus, it is to this that Mason turns to close his
contribution. Acknowledging his question as a rhetorical one, he asks:
[W]ould it be possible to predict the atmospheric evolution from an initial state with inﬁnite
precision inﬁnitely far ahead? (Mason, 1986, page 58).
5.1.9. His answer, of course, is “no”, and on two accounts. First, the entirety of the initial state
cannot be observed in principle, even if it could be observed in the absence of measurement error.
Second, while atmospheric behaviour does have some periodic components (e.g. diurnal and annual
ﬂuctuations), it has a strong aperiodic component, notably the movement of cyclones and anti-
cyclones across middle-latitude continents and oceans. “An aperiodic system is inherently unstable”,
Mason tells us, “so that the imposition of a random disturbance will render it chaotic (i.e., unpre-
dictable) in the long run”.
5.1.10. Today, the Met Ofﬁce (2017) is still able to report on “Continually Improving Our
Forecasts”. No longer is the 15-layer global model of Sir John Mason’s days in use – but the same kinds
of error statistics and index of forecasting skill surely are. Speciﬁcally, progress has been achieved
through “[i]nvesting in technology, scientiﬁc expertise and veriﬁcation”. Among these, technology has
amounted to an IBM supercomputer, upgraded in 2012 and capable of 1,200 trillion calculations
per second, and a 70-layer model at the global scale (along with similar 70-layer models of progressively
more ﬁnely resolved spatial detail for Europe and the United Kingdom). Investment in these models and
in the function of veriﬁcation, to which a group of analysts is entirely dedicated, has enabled the Met
Ofﬁce (as it reports) to outperform ﬁve of the major operational NWP centres. Over the same period
(August 2009 to February 2013) the Met Ofﬁce’s NWP (veriﬁcation) Index rose from just over 117 to
just over 123 (the target set for March 2013), almost without faltering (Met Ofﬁce, 2011).
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5.1.11. Across three and more decades, then, impressive progress has been made in respect of the
statistic of forecasting skill and the accuracy of the models used for NWP.3 Targets for forecasting
capacity are set by the Met Ofﬁce; they are to achieve a speciﬁed value for an NWP Index by a
speciﬁed date. And progress towards (or away from) this target is tracked publicly: with transpar-
ency, that is, and for all to witness.4
5.1.12. Monitoring progress: institutional arrangements: In 2000, the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) produced its Technical Document TD 1023 “Guidelines on Performance
Assessment of Public Weather Services”. The web page introducing this document succinctly (and
signiﬁcantly) shifts emphasis away from the statistics of forecasts and the veriﬁcation of models
towards user satisfaction with the model’s forecasts. It states:
The aim of the evaluation is twofold: ﬁrstly, to ensure that products such as warnings and
forecasts are accurate and skilful from a technical point of view and secondly, that they meet
user requirements, and that users have a positive perception of, and are satisﬁed with the
products (WMO, 2017).
5.1.13. Technical Document 1023 pushes the point further home:
Forecast accuracy is irrelevant if the forecast products are not available to the public at a time
and in a form that is useful.
An assessment programme can be seen in the context of a quality system, where it is important
to ensure that the information gathered and processed is focussed on user requirements, to be
used in making decisions and taking actions to improve performance, rather than just being
gathered for the sake of it (WMO, 2000, page 1).
5.1.14. Of course, this is not to say that veriﬁcation is unimportant. As the web page states:
The main goal of a veriﬁcation process is to constantly improve the quality (skill and accuracy)
of the services. This includes:
∙ Establishment of a skill and accuracy reference against which subsequent changes in forecast
procedures or the introduction of a new technology can be measured;
∙ Identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc strengths and weaknesses in a forecaster’s skills and the need for
forecaster training and similar identiﬁcation of a model’s particular skills and the need for
model improvement; and
∙ Information to the management about a forecast programme’s past and current level of skill
to plan future improvements; information can be used in making decisions concerning the
organisational structure, modernisation and restructuring of the National Meteorological
service.
3 Theories abound as to why the Great Storm of 1987 was not forecast (Kilsby, 2017, personal commu-
nication). In fact, a major event was forecast, but not as severe as it turned out to be. Indeed, previous UK Met
Ofﬁce forecasts of this storm had been better (and MeteoFrance forecast it better, in the event). The Met Ofﬁce
missed it because of gaps in the mesh of the observational network (ones covered today by the greater use of
remote sensing). Arguably, the structure of the models at that time lacked some of the physics (of latent heat
release) that is now believed necessary for simulating the genesis and evolution of such a storm. No amount of
extra computer power, therefore, would have helped make a better forecast.
4 Error statistics aplenty can be found at http://www.metofﬁce.gov.uk/weather/tropicalcyclone/veriﬁcation
(last accessed 19 April 2017). Typically, they cover the period 1988–2016.
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5.1.15. In this we can see the virtue of consistency of model and forecast assessment (not just
transparency).
5.1.16. Nevertheless, out of a total of 32 pages of text in the main body of WMO TD 1023, 15 are
devoted to “User-based Assessment”. Their content covers variously: surveys of the user community
(almost the entire appended material is an exemplar of such a survey); focus groups; public opinion
monitoring; feedback and response mechanisms; consultations through users’ meetings and work-
shops; and the collection of what are referred to as “anecdotal data”. We should be left in no doubt
about the emphasis national weather forecasting services are urged (by the WMO) to place on user-
based assessment, vis-à-vis veriﬁcation.
5.1.17. Admiring what we cannot have: There are things that transfer readily across the disciplines
and sectors, from atmospheric physics and weather forecasting to economics and the insurance
industry, and there are things that do not.
5.1.18. On the positive side of the ledger, economic–ﬁnancial forecasting error statistics can be
reported just as they are for weather forecasting. For instance, Sir Terence Burns’ contribution to the
1986 Symposium on Predictability mirrors that of Sir John Mason. Error statistics are plotted for 1-
year- and 2-year-ahead forecasts of GDP and the retail price index, for the years 1963–1985 and
1971–1985, respectively (Burns, 1986). Salient, however, is the absence of corresponding statistics
for (economic) forecasting skill, which, as quite apparent from the foregoing, is distinctively central
in weather forecasting.5 At the time, Burns was working for HM Treasury.
5.1.19. On the negative side of the ledger, and as the Preface to the 1986 Predictability Symposium
observes (Mason et al., 1986), there is this:
The weather forecast does not affect the weather, but the economic forecast may well affect the
economy!
5.1.20. Adding to this obvious (and profound) difference, if not elaborating it expressly, Sen opened
the Symposium with his paper on “Prediction and Economic Theory”. In this he reasoned that the
origins of why economic predictions are so difﬁcult lay then (as doubtless still now) in the complexity
of what he called “the choice problem” and “the interaction problem”:
One source of this complexity [in how economic inﬂuences operate] lies in the difﬁculty in
anticipating human behaviour, which can be inﬂuenced by a tremendously varied collection of
social, political, psychological, biological and other factors. Another source is the inherent
difﬁculty in anticipating the results of interactions of millions of human beings with different
values, objectives, motivations, expectations, endowments, rights, means and circumstances,
dealing with each other in a wide variety of institutional settings (Sen, 1986, pages 4–5).
5.1.21. The choices resulting from human behaviour may well subsume the processing of forecasts of
future system behaviour deriving from a computational model – something we have referred to in the
5 One can well understand why. In contrast to forecasting that, say, the weather at 09:00 hours a week from
today will be identical with today’s weather at 09:00 hours, to forecast that next year’s GDP will be the same as
this year’s is going to be quite a decent forecast. On that basis, for that kind of economic feature, the naïve
persistence forecast will be rather good and employing a model may rarely perform better, that is,, its forecasting
skill would be low.
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discussions of our Working Party as the problem of “endogeneity”. But Sen (1986) makes little
reference to the quantitative side of economic forecasting.
5.1.22. Nearly three decades later, Greenspan (2013) certainly does. Indeed, his book bears the title
The Map and the Territory, qualiﬁed (signiﬁcantly) by the subtitle Risk, Human Nature, and the
Future of Forecasting. The book is replete with tables and time-series of economic and ﬁnancial
statistics; regression analysis is prominent. What Greenspan has to say of the future of (economic)
forecasting deserves to be reported in some detail. In doing so, we seek to redress the rather negative
balance in our comparison (from 1986) of the gulf between weather forecasting and economic
forecasting.
5.1.23. To begin, Greenspan reaches back to a time well before 1986. He wants to anchor what he
refers to as the “propensities” of human nature in what Keynes called “animal spirits”:
My enquiry begins with an examination of “animal spirits”, the term John Maynard Keynes
famously coined to refer to “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the
[rational] outcome of a weighted average of quantitative beneﬁts multiplied by quantitative
probabilities”. Keynes was talking about the spirit that impels economic activity, but we now
amend his notion of animal spirits to its obverse, fear-driven risk aversion (Greenspan, 2013,
page 8).
5.1.24. Greenspan proceeds to deﬁne a dozen and more of his human propensities, ranging from fear
and euphoria over herd behaviour to time preferences, home bias and family dependency. He does so
because what Haldane dubbed the “’Michael Fish’ moment” for economic forecasting – the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 – was something of an epiphany for Greenspan:
[For] now, after the past several years of closely studying the manifestations of animal spirits
during times of severe crisis, I have come to the view that there is something more systematic
about the way people behave irrationally, especially during periods of extreme economic
stress, than I had previously contemplated. In other words, this behavior can be measured and
made an integral part of the economic forecasting process and the formation of economic
policy. [Emphasis added]
In a change of my perspective, I have recently come to appreciate that “spirits” do in fact
display “consistencies” that can importantly enhance our ability to identify emerging asset
price bubbles in equities, commodities, and exchange rates — and even to anticipate the
economic consequences of their ultimate collapse and recovery (2013, page 9).
5.1.25. And so it is that in the closing chapter (“The Bottom Line”), we ﬁnd Greenspan’s
manifesto for the future of (economic) forecasting, summarised by this sequence of quotes. First, on
page 291:
When I was ﬁrst contemplating the substance of this book, I was fully aware that a basic
assumption of classical and neoclassical economics — that people behave in their rational
long-term self-interest — was not wholly accurate. Moreover, the crisis of 2008 had impelled
me to reassess my earlier conclusion that our animal spirits were essentially random and hence
impervious to economic modeling. I was amazed, however, during the early months of this
venture at just how many supposedly random variables were explained by statistically highly
signiﬁcant regression equations. Many, if not most, economic choices, the data show, are
demonstrably stable over the long run for as far back as I can measure (Greenspan, 2013).
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5.1.26. Second, on page 292:
Producing a fully detailed model is beyond the scope of this book.
These models [those of the future] should embody equations that, when possible, measure and
forecast systematic human behavior and corporate culture (Greenspan, 2013).
5.1.27. Then, third, on page 293:
But we are far removed from the halcyon days of the 1960s, when there was great optimism
that econometric models offered new capabilities to accurately judge the future.
This journey of analysis has ﬁnally come to rest in a place I could never have contemplated
when I ﬁrst began to recalibrate my economic views in the light of what the crisis of 2008 was
telling us about ourselves (Greenspan, 2013).
5.1.28. Thus, to conclude, on page 299:
[W]e are driven by a whole array of propensities— most prominent, fear, euphoria, and herd
behavior [at most, three of the thirteen]— but, ultimately, our intuitions are broadly subject to
reasoned conﬁrmation (Greenspan, 2013).
5.1.29. Considerations for actuarial models: What, then, are the lessons to be learned from this look
over our professional, disciplinary boundaries across to weather forecasting? What does all this
mean – the weather forecasting of today and 1986 and economic forecasting of 1986 and today – for
practical progress in communicating and managing model risk in the insurance industry?
5.1.30. Signiﬁcantly, we (as actuarial professionals) cannot enjoy the detachment of the mechanics of
future weather from today’s model-generated forecast of it. Neither may we cling to the aspiration that
(one day) the truth of the matter will be revealed in some gargantuan set of differential equations and an
unbelievably all-encompassing, ﬁnely granulated, real-time observing system for generating (objective)
facts and data – about all those human intentions and interactions to which Sen (1986) refers.
5.1.31. Yet, there might be scope for reporting (somewhere) the statistics of our forecasting skill,
with consistency, so that progress (or not) may be tracked over the years and decades, and with
transparency – for those who have a “right” to see into the black boxes of modelling in the insurance
industry. True, the user audiences and constituencies served by national weather forecasting institutions
may be very different from those served within and by insurance businesses large and small.
5.1.32. Nevertheless, a leaf or two might be taken out of the WMO’s Technical Document TD
1023 “Guidelines on Performance Assessment of Public Weather Services”. We have much in
sympathy with its focus on user satisfaction and users’ positive perceptions of models and model-
generated forecasts. After all, given Andy Haldane’s jibe, and as observed by several members of our
Working Party, modellers, models and their forecasts – dreaded experts with their dreaded expertise,
no less – are not held in high public esteem at present (see also Williams, 2017). At the very least, this
case study (in particular, the WMO Technical Document) re-emphasises what the insurance industry
and profession already seek to achieve with their Continuing Professional Development activities and
their Technical Actuarial Standard (TAS) protocols.
5.1.33. The skill of our models and the skills of our modellers are ever “works in progress”; and as
such they are in need of active continual improvement. That much we can take from our admiration
of the practice of weather forecasting. But are we questioning whether we have the right skills for our
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sector, that is, ones that motivate improvement, as opposed to enabling more boxes to be ticked with
ever greater routine efﬁciency?
5.1.34. The key is that there are some “positives” involved in the use of models in the insurance
industry, not just the perceived “negatives” of yet more procedures to be followed for the purposes of
complying with regulations. How exactly our profession might go about this in a sincere and
genuine manner may be a sizeable challenge. We have no wish to be accused of yet more “spin” and
obfuscation with what the public already looks down on as the “black boxes” of our models.
5.1.35. In the short term – building upon the use test of Solvency II, for instance, and taking the
pragmatic business-person’s perspective – we might seek to lessen and dilute out the presently overly
strong association of models with the “burdens”, “obligations” and the “worries” of capital alloca-
tions. Imagine, for example, a ﬁrm’s model users (as opposed to the model developers) parameterising
its models directly, something which would not be possible for the consumers of weather-forecasting
products. Indeed, given Greenspan’s reported success in encapsulating his “human propensities” in the
statistical forms of fat-tailed distributions and regression relationships, the nature of the model and the
language surrounding its discussion and parameterisation might thus be a step closer to the familiar,
colloquial terms of everyday business (as opposed to the abstractions of computer software). We might
even suggest there could be a certain user-friendly “greying” or “colouring” of the model in this.
Furthermore, accounting better for these human propensities lies at the root of reversing the low esteem
in which economic forecasting is held, relative to weather forecasting.
5.1.36. In the longer term, there may be scope for developing ways of designing and using models to
address the challenges of “group-think” forming and then crystallising out in the making of insur-
ance business decisions. The HM Treasury Report of 2013 (HM Treasury, 2013) was well aware of
the difﬁculties associated with group-think in respect of the use of models in support of government
decision-making, as already discussed in our Sessional Paper from Phase 1 (Aggarwal et al., 2016,
pages 291–292, in particular). Group-think suggests a ﬁrm is, as it were, “touching just one base” in its
deliberations prior to coming to the actionable decision. The ﬁrm is using just a single rationality: a
single view of how markets work, with a set of business aspirations and risk preferences for the future
similarly aligned with just this single mental model of the way the world works. In particular, in the
context of Figure 2 (see sections 1.1.16–1.1.17) group-think would correspond to parameterising the
computational model according to just one of the four cultures of model users: that of solely the
“Conﬁdent model users”, or solely that of the “Conscientious modellers”, or the “Uncertainty avoi-
ders”, or the “Intuitive decision makers”. In other words, this is the situation in which just the one
predominant view in the ﬁrm is aired before the decision is made (and probably alternative views may
not be heeded, nor even canvassed). There are precedents for how a plurality of views and aspirations
might be explored computationally, that is, the means to “touch all four bases” before settling upon the
decision. Oddly enough, these precedents can be found in the differential-equation-dominated worlds of
climate change (van Asselt & Rotmans, 1996) and environmental protection (Beck, 1991, 2014). There
are distinct echoes in them of the Reverse Sensitivity Testing touched on above (in sections 4.6.13–
4.6.16). But as we say, technically facilitating this line of enquiry, for then its implementation in
practice, might be something for the more distant future.
5.2. Aerospace
5.2.1. The aerospace industry is a sophisticated user of modelling techniques. Two well-known areas
include: (i) computational ﬂuid dynamics (CFD) modelling of aerodynamic responses in support of
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airframe design; and (ii) and the use of automated ﬂight controls systems that underpins both “ﬂy by
wire” assistance for human controlled ﬂight and autopilot functionality.
5.2.2. When things go wrong, detailed investigations into the cause of any incidents are carried out
by independent investigators and learning points for design, manufacture or operation are published.
The learning points often become regulatory imperatives.
5.2.3. Key points for CFD: The reason for using these techniques is to make the overall design-time
processes more efﬁcient and to reduce the time to market. This does not remove the need for testing
in wind tunnels and ﬂight-testing in the latter phases of development because ultimately the physical
aircraft is the product that must ﬂy in the real world, not the model in a simulation.
5.2.4. Whilst CFD modelling can make the overall process more efﬁcient it comes with its own costs
of supplying modelling expertise and the need for considerable computer power to provide the
accuracy required.
5.2.5. Amongst the signiﬁcant modelling challenge are the need to divide the three dimensional
modelling space using a practical-sized grid, ensuring that the individual “cells” of the grid com-
municate adequately between each other and the modelling of discontinuities of the physical world.
5.2.6. Once the CFD modelling phases are complete then the testing moves into real-world validation
with a series of physical models. Differences between the modelled result and the physical results are
a driver for change as the physical development continues. The differences between modelled and
physical results may also reveal potential enhancements to the modelling tools.
5.2.7. Aerospace components are designed and tested within a complex “envelope” covering mul-
tiple parameters such as weight, altitude, velocity, attitude, banking angles and so on. To ensure the
integrity of the individual components and the safety of the overall aircraft, operation outside of the
accepted “envelope” is not permitted.
5.2.8. Considerations for actuarial models: Although actuarial models do not have a physical
representation there will be opportunities to compare the results of an actuarial model with the
real world that is it intended to represent. This should form part of a model review process that
regulations or good practice require.
5.2.9. The independence of CFD modelling and wind tunnel tests is self-evident. The latter will
form a key sense-check on computed modelling errors arising from ﬂaws in the coding or execution.
In the actuarial modelling world there may only be a single model and its software implementation.
Where the model is very complex and perhaps contains counter-intuitive results in some
circumstances, there may be beneﬁts in constructing an independent model that can be used to
validate key features. “Back of the envelope checks” are much harder to compute with a calculator in
the 2010s.
5.2.10. Modern ﬁnancial instruments, consumer products, demographics and customer, and manage-
ment actions may all contain discontinuous distributions and non-linear responses. Actuarial model
design should identify these features and assess their potential to create material discontinuities in the
model results that are used for decision-making. The selection of modelling granularity is likely to have
greater relevance in one or more of the modelling dimensions where discontinuities exist.
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5.2.11. The laws of physics do not change, but the markets and demographics that actuarial models
are created to represent do. Actuarial models may beneﬁt from having an “operating envelope”
deﬁned for them that may reduce the risk of a model being used in inappropriate or untested
environments where the results are not yet proven to be correct.
5.2.12. Key points for ﬂight control systems: Flight control systems have been created to reduce
workloads for ﬂight crew and the current generations of systems are now capable of carrying out
nearly all of the phases of ﬂight without human intervention.
5.2.13. These applications prevent the ﬂight crew from attempting to push individual settings or
perhaps the performance of the aircraft in one particular area outside the operating envelope. There
have been cases where the envelope, which is a complex set of inter-related factors, was incorrectly
implemented in software and was a contributing factor in the loss of life.
5.2.14. In some military applications the ﬂight control system goes a step further as the intentional
instability of such aircraft, designed this way to provide additional manoeuvrability, means that
ﬂight computers must be used as a human could not normally ﬂy the aircraft without their assistance.
5.2.15. Critical systems areas may be engineered with multiple levels of redundancy to reduce the
risks arising from single points of failure. The redundancy may involve physical components such as
sensors and actuators and also multiple software routines. These can also be combined to take a
majority “vote” on actions to be taken in the event of conﬂicting or missing signals and “fail safe”
designs which reduce the risk of a wider problem arising when some components or processes fail.
5.2.16. Considerations for actuarial models: The processes wrapped around many actuarial models
have already required signiﬁcant investment to automate and streamline, to meet shorter reporting
cycles and enable operating efﬁciencies. There is little new to be found in considering automation per se.
5.2.17. A more interesting area to explore is whether actuarial models and their processes have clearly
deﬁned operating envelopes to ensure that they are not used beyond the boundaries of their design.
5.2.18. Actuarial models will often be run within organisations that have business continuity plans
that provide for redundancy in ofﬁce locations or computer systems. At a more localised and
granular level there may be some beneﬁt in exploring how a model would be run in the absence of
one or more areas of input data. For example, if there was a signiﬁcant change in market values and
a model needed to be re-run, but a set of scenarios required as input to the model was not available,
consideration could be given to how an approximation to the inputs could be created or how
previous model results could be reused to allow for the new conditions.
5.2.19. Key points for incident investigation: The purpose is to learn lessons for the future and reduce
the risk of loss of life, injury and also the consequent ﬁnancial impacts. Independent investigators
examine, with the widest of remits, any and all factors that may have contributed to the incident.
Investigations may also be carried out into near misses and other events that exhibit the potential to
have caused a more signiﬁcant incident.
5.2.20. Areas of investigation cover design, manufacture, maintenance, operation, security, proce-
dural and human factors, and in many cases an incident will be found to have been caused by
multiple factors, often from different areas.
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5.2.21. A key foundation of all investigations is the data retrieved from the ﬂight data recorder and
the voice recorder – the so-called black boxes. Consequently the performance and resilience of these
recorders are standardised and mandatory, depending on the category of aircraft and its type of
operation.
5.2.22. The human factors involved include the relationship between the ﬂight crew and how this
may have impacted on their performance. Factors that may be examined include experience,
corporate seniority, procedures and training.
5.2.23. Considerations for actuarial models: Problems with actuarial models have consequences that
are on a lower scale than those in the aerospace industry, but they may still have high ﬁnancial and
social costs.
5.2.24. Individuals with the relevant professional skills and independence should therefore carry out
investigation into signiﬁcant model failures or underperformance.
5.2.25. Investigation into model performance should not, however, be limited to failure, but be built
into the normal operating processes. In many areas of actuarial modelling this review process is built
into the regulatory framework.
5.2.26. Human factors are an important area for users of actuarial models, where user here should
be taken to mean everyone from the model operators, through management to the ultimate decision-
makers who rely on the outputs. (It is an oversimplifying generalisation to say that the builders and
runners of models need to improve their communication skills and that the ultimate decision-makers
need to improve their understanding of the construction and the limitations of a model… but when
ﬁnancial models go wrong, those factors are often present.)
5.3. Software Development: Design and Testing
5.3.1. The development of models and software are closely interlinked. For the purpose of this
section a distinction is to be made between the “conceptual model” and the “software imple-
mentation” of that model. In theory, if not in practice, results from a “conceptual model” could be
calculated using a pad of paper, a pencil and a calculator.
5.3.2. From the 1980s, the personal computer revolution placed ever-increasing computer power in
the hands of actuaries, enabling ever more sophisticated models to be implemented. Actuarial
software implementations use a combination of specialist actuarial tools, general-purpose databases
and spreadsheet systems and bespoke code. In all of their software design, build, test and deployment
activities, actuaries have had access to the expertise of information technology (IT) professionals and
to the evolving tools and techniques of that profession.
5.3.3. As a relatively new industry with ever more diverse application and continued rapid growth,
software development methodologies have also continued to evolve and adapt. Over the past decade,
the use of “Test-Driven Design” (TTD) and “Behaviour-Driven Design” (BDD) methodologies have
been widely adopted to support faster development cycles. These methodologies are often deployed
with “Continuous Integration” – a technique where incremental changes are made to software on a
frequent basis (often daily) and an evolving development version of a software system is always being
run and tested.
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5.3.4. Whilst no one single style or methodology of system development can be said to be best suited
to the development of actuarial conceptual models and their software implementations, these newer
techniques bring from the IT industry some vocabulary, methodology and standardisation that may
be of use. In addition, these methods formalise and support some of the styles of rapid application
development that many actuarial professionals have used for the past 20 + years.
5.3.5. Key points for TTD/BDD: The essence of these techniques is that the tests for the new
software are deﬁned and created up-front before the new code is written. Usually the tests themselves
will be part of a testing framework that executes the new software as it is created.
5.3.6. The new software is then incrementally developed to meet the requirements of the tests. In
general the “TDD” name is applied when dealing with relatively small pieces of code, whilst “BDD”
applies to a system or a subsystem.
5.3.7. Beneﬁts arising from TDD/BDD include clearer documentation of what the software
has been designed to do and whether, according to the test status, it is capable of doing it as
required.
5.3.8. A corollary of the scope of the TDD/BDD test suite is that the software may not be considered
as capable of performing a function or dealing with a situation for which there is no explicit test.
5.3.9. Considerations for actuarial models: TDD/BDD methodologies are useful techniques to
consider using to develop both the conceptual models and their software implementation.
5.3.10. Whether or not such a methodology is used for developing a speciﬁc software imple-
mentation, the underlying thinking should be an important check for the use of a conceptual model.
It is important that a model, or the software, is only used in an environment and with inputs that
have been tested for and for which it is known to perform as required. (This is the same point as the
aerospace operating envelope.)
5.3.11. The creation of sensitivity tests and scenarios for actuarial models is a closely related
practice.
5.3.12. Software development: meta data: As noted in section 4.6.3, meta data is information or data
that describes other data. Meta data can be somewhat mundane, such as the count of rows and
columns in a table, but even this can usefully be the foundation of important tests and controls that
will be very familiar and commonplace to actuaries using many types of software.
5.3.13. The increasingly diverse sources of data being collected, transformed and stored by appli-
cations in general has increased the attention given to the meta data that is generated by software
systems as they carry out their primary tasks. Although the lines of what constitutes meta data versus
what constitutes primary data and results may be blurred, it is not necessary to draw a ﬁrm dis-
tinction between them where the information encapsulated by the meta data is useful.
5.3.14. Considerations for actuarial models: Meta data has for a long time been an important
resource for controls of actuarial models, assumptions and results. As new and more complex models
are developed it may be helpful to consider areas where meta data may provide additional insights
into why the model has performed in the way that it has.
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5.3.15. Meta data may also be designed to provide a more efﬁcient way of analysing and comparing
results between different runs of a model. For example, when seeking to evaluate the impact of a
basis change on a calculation of liabilities, it may be useful to arrange that the outputs of the model
provide supporting intermediate data. In this way, the impact of a change to expense assumptions for
a sensitivity analysis might be shown as being isolated to the expense meta data with other meta data
(e.g. number of policies, premiums, claims and investment returns) being unchanged between the two
runs. If these other items were to change in response to a basis that has updated expenses, this could
be an indication of a problem with the setup or the execution. (And in a more sophisticated model,
where policyholder or management actions in the model are a function of expenses, further layers of
meta data could be designed to provide additional insights into the way that these actions have been
triggered when expenses differ.)
5.4. Lessons From the Auditors
5.4.1. Much value can be gained from considering model risk from the perspective of a ﬁrm’s
internal and external auditors. These actors are sometimes referred to as the “third line” of defence
in mitigating model risk, behind the “ﬁrst line” (the day-to-day model users) and “second line”
(a ﬁrm’s dedicated risk and oversight function).
5.4.2. From discussions with auditors, the following challenges are made which we consider to have
great validity and are at the heart of mitigating model risk. We imagine a scenario where a senior
decision-maker within a ﬁrm is presented with the results of a model and asked to make a signiﬁcant
decision using those results.
5.4.3. From the perspective of the decision-maker, it is reasonable to ask some simple but key
questions around this scenario. First, have the model or models used to produce these results been
used appropriately? And, second, are those models that have been used “correct”? Is the metho-
dology implemented by the models sound, and has it been reviewed? Could, an audit trail be
produced showing a clear lineage from initial model speciﬁcation, test plans, test evidence and model
sign-off dating back to the ﬁrst version of the model?
5.4.4. We argue that we should be able to answer these questions positively – as being unable to do
so must inevitably cast doubt over the model’s results that have been presented. But, how many
models that we use have this watertight “speciﬁcation-test-signoff” audit trail back to the ﬁrst
version of the model? Surely, this is the gold standard for which we should be aiming.
5.4.5. Further, very often modelled results are not simply the result of a single model but can consist
of a complex modelling process with many different “cogs” in the wheel. In these circumstances, are
the criteria in section 5.4.3 not equally relevant to all the components?
5.4.6. From discussions with auditors, and practical experience, it is imperative that when models are
used all controls around those models are evidenced in real time. Examples of controls include: ﬁrst,
that only those models that are listed in your central inventory are used; that all doer/checker
processes have been completed and real-time evidence has been provided; and all model results can
be satisfactorily explained.
5.4.7. To summarise, from an audit perspective, good model governance and evidence of correct
model usage must be at the heart of any model risk governance framework. This includes a rigourous
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model development process (change requirements, testing and sign-off evidence) and evidence that only
the latest signed-off models have been used, and that those models have been used appropriately.
6. Practical Applications of Model Risk Management in Actuarial Fields
6.1. Life Insurance
6.1.1. The authors have found the following approaches to be helpful in mitigating model risk
especially now that Solvency II is live and reporting has become a business as usual quarterly activity.
∙ all models are logged in a central inventory to give a reliable snapshot at each valuation date of all
signed-off models with version number and model purpose, and associated documentation and
training notes;
∙ education and controls to ensure staff use the “correct” (i.e. latest signed-off version) of each
model – and checking to monitor compliance;
∙ a model development process that distinguishes between “central” and “local” changes, with
differing but similar control processes applicable to each;
∙ an established model development process that consists of: idea initiation and feasibility
investigation; model change prioritisation to produce an agreed model change stack each quarter;
requirements speciﬁcations for those developments that become approved; development of agreed
model changes based on user requirements. Then, functionality testing based on user
requirements; followed by UAT of model changes; and, ﬁnally, end-to-end testing of all model
changes brought together before the next quarterly reporting date;
∙ great beneﬁts have been seen in the automation of time-consuming, repetitive and manual
processes (e.g. via Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros);
∙ detailed commenting of any underlying VBA code such that code is written “for others” with the
acknowledgement that models and VBA code base will change over time;
∙ where possible, simpliﬁcation of modelling processes and removal of modelling where this can be
justiﬁed;
∙ production controls performed in “real time” and evidence prepared with the expectation that this
will be shared with internal and external auditors and senior management; and
∙ common folder structures used to store models, model inputs and results each quarter, making
ﬁnding models and key input ﬁles straightforward quarter on quarter.
6.1.2. Some of these points are now expanded on further.
6.1.3. Maintenance of a central model inventory: At any particular time, a business should know all
models that are in use, their names and version numbers, the purpose for which they should be used,
and a named owner for each model. We hope that this statement is hard to argue against. Inventories
could be at a department level and be owned by the head of department, or more ambitiously be at a
company-wide level possibly global in extent.
6.1.4. The key point is this: if we do not know what models are in use, then how do we ensure that the
right models have been used in our modelling activities? As a minimum we would expect an inventory
to record model name, version number, purpose, ownership, evidence of compliance with End User
Application standards, and have sufﬁciently detailed documentation to support its successful use.
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6.1.5. An inventory may run to many hundreds of tools and, while it might take time and resource to
compile, we have no doubt of the beneﬁts that arise after the task has been completed. Importantly,
the inventory needs to be kept up to date as a living document and should be updated in sync with
the quarterly reporting cycle.
6.1.6.Model development process: central versus local change: We have found it beneﬁcial to divide
all models into one of two categories: those that are “centrally” managed and those that are
“locally” managed. Centrally managed tools will typically be the most important models, for
example, those used in ﬁnancial reporting, pricing or business planning, and these should only
change following a well-established model governance process (see section 6.1.8).
6.1.7. Locally managed tools cover all other tools, for example, those “helper” tools in processing
and validation teams, for example, which do not directly feed into the central tools. Again, change
here should follow a local change process which will have similarities to the central change process
but with perhaps less formal requirements gathering and sign-off.
6.1.8. Model development process: practicalities: A robust model development process should be
established. This lets the business change its models in a controlled manner and helps balance the
competing requirements for more model change (from change owners) against resource demands
(the number of staff available to specify, make and test the model change). Frequently, there are more
model changes desired than can be accommodated by current resource and so the list of model
changes will need to be prioritised with some being deferred to a following quarter, for example.
Model changes should be ranked by business beneﬁt, whether that is in terms of monetary beneﬁt or
improvements in risk control that a model change can bring.
6.1.9. Once a set of model changes are agreed for a particular quarter, detailed model development
requirements need to be written and agreed before model development begins. At the same time, a
functionality test plan needs to be written and signed-off by the model change owner. The aim here
being to demonstrate that the model changes have been done correctly based on the model change
requirements. We have found it very beneﬁcial to share documents using a single source (e.g. SharePoint
or company intranet) so that colleagues working on model developments can all easily ﬁnd the latest
documents and to ensure that, at all times, people are working from the same version.
6.1.10. Following successful functionality testing, the model change needs to be passed to UAT. The
aim of UAT is to establish that the model change affects the model results (e.g. ﬁnancial results or
pricing quotes) in an understood, anticipated and acceptable manner. A UAT plan needs to be
written and signed-off by the model change owner. Frequently, UAT will focus on a regression test
back to the previous year end or prior quarterly reporting period.
6.1.11. Following successful UAT of all quarterly model changes, an end-to-end run is done ahead of
the next quarterly reporting date to check that all parts of the process (“cogs in the wheel”) work
together seamlessly and to ensure a smooth modelling process at the quarterly valuation date.
6.1.12. We note some caveats: we have found that the functionality testing, UAT and end-to-end can
work well, but timings are often under-estimated and we suspect that this is an industry wide problem.
It is very easy to plan for a model change to come in at a particular date in the future, but much harder
to prevent scope creep in development and delays in receiving signed-off requirements, development and
testing, such that meeting the original intended date very often becomes a signiﬁcant challenge.
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6.1.13. In general, therefore, we suggest that fewer model changes are brought through each quarter
and those that are have been relentlessly prioritised to deliver the most business beneﬁt for the
resources employed. We have found it necessary to consider not only model changes but knock-on
impacts to upstream and downstream processes, for example, if input formats change (but under-
lying numbers are unchanged) and this needs to be anticipated in advance. For this, a detailed
process map is required and should show all key reporting metrics such that if any part of the
“process” changes the impact across the board is readily understood.
6.1.14. We also strongly endorse continuous improvements, no matter how small, to ensure that
modelling processes become slicker and progressively more coherent and streamlined quarter-on-
quarter. There are always ways that models can work better, or more reliable and efﬁcient controls
that can be performed. Given that key models may be run many hundreds of times during a quarter,
improvements in run speed can be very beneﬁcial. Likewise, time invested improving model
documentation and process notes is rarely wasted if it helps ensure that models are run correctly
ﬁrst time.
6.1.15. Commenting of VBA code: Typically, models such as Excel spreadsheets are automated by
the use of macros written in VBA code, very often not by professional computer programmers but
instead by technically minded colleagues. Workbooks are usually developed by a single person in a
silo, usually without collaboration with anyone else. Because of this “amateur programmer”
approach, we ﬁnd that VBA code is often poorly commented and the level of commenting in VBA
macros is signiﬁcantly poorer than would be required for commercial software.
6.1.16. While poorly commented VBA code is not an automatic source of model risk, we think well-
commented code offers a number of beneﬁts to the business: it forces developers to think of other
future developers and write their code for others; it reduces key person dependency; and it offers a
good degree of future prooﬁng. We have found good commenting of code very helpful. A company
should have an agreed set of VBA standards to provide common guidance to developers. Some of the
standards will be mandatory and others only recommended.
6.1.17. Our recommended key mandatory VBA features include:
∙ use of Option Explicit at the top of all modules to enforce syntax checking and ensure code
integrity when Debug >Compile Project is run in the VB Editor;
∙ referencing cells by named ranges wherever possible, and avoiding cell addresses in code;
∙ meaningful commenting of code particularly highlighting the purpose of subroutines and
functions, and logic of code chunks. Comments should be kept up to date. For example,
this is discussed further in Bovey et al. (2009, Chapter 3). The following type of comment header
at the top of subroutines helps orientate a new developer tasked with adapting the codebase:
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6.1.18. It is important to ensure that each time a model is used the model starts in a “clean” state
so that there is no risk of “stale” data being entered into the model. This is particularly a risk where
models read in data – we must ﬁrst ensure that all old data are deleted so that there is no chance that
a small amount of data read in merely appends to a large set of old data still in the model. The old
data need to be completely deleted ﬁrst.
6.1.19. A consistent naming convention for variables (e.g. intCounter, strMessage) makes code easier
to follow, understand and extend.
6.1.20. Saving workbooks containing macros as .xlsb (Excel Binary Workbook) instead of .xlsm
(Excel Macro-enable workbook) to save ﬁle space, with .xlsb workbooks typically being half or one
third the size of their .xlsm equivalents
6.1.21. Automation of process: If there are signiﬁcant parts of any modelling process that are manually
intensive then these should, over time, become progressively automated – either through macro-enabled
workbooks or other technology. The beneﬁts of automation are many but chieﬂy: much less risk of
setup issues caused by human error particularly during time pressures of reporting cycles; ability to
accommodate extra unplanned model runs if these become necessary; reduction in key person depen-
dencies; and, perhaps, reduction in staff turnover as less frustration in manual activities. Automation of
process may well lead to a lot of model change especially if this has not been a priority to date.
6.1.22. Simpliﬁcation of modelling processes: We have seen good examples of three-stage modelling
being simpliﬁed to two-stage modelling, affording model production and results validation teams
much improved processes. Manual interim model inputs are progressively combined into the main
suite of models ensuring that the end-to-end model cycle is quicker with fewer hands-in/hand-offs
than before. These savings, especially quarter-on-quarter, can be very signiﬁcant.
6.1.23. Even better than automating processes is the complete removal of those processes in the ﬁrst
place, often in response to the challenge of “why are we modelling this?”. We have seen successful
model simpliﬁcation, for example, removal of tax liability modelling for stressed scenarios within an
Internal model and decommissioning of the tax model where this process was seen as excessively
complex and adding little value to the business.
6.2. Banking
6.2.1. In a speech on the topic of Governance and the role of Boards delivered to Westminster
Business Forum in November 2015 (Bank of England, 2015), Andrew Bailey (Bank of England
Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of the PRA) outlined
expectations in the area of Model Risk.
Non-Executives should be put in a position to possess a general understanding of the model…
without detailed technical knowledge. That’s the job of the Executive, to explain complexity,
provide good Management Information … and enable challenge and thus accountability.
If Non-Executives do not feel that they can meet these expectations, they should demand the
time and support to enable them to do so.
6.2.2. In particular, the following were highlighted as areas a Board needs to understand:
∙ Where is the model expected to work well?
∙ In what circumstances is it likely to break down?
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∙ Is the overall model output credible?
∙ What “moves the dial” in terms of key assumptions or judgements?
∙ Are those assumptions and judgements reasonable?
6.2.3. Thus, banks have had to ensure they develop a framework which addresses these, and other,
expectations from the regulatory authorities.
6.2.4. In a bank there exists a multitude of “models”, from the simple spreadsheet put together
by an individual to do a little checking job, through to the huge complex models which drive large parts
of the business. For a bank, the key risks are generally considered to be ﬁnancial loss, regulatory censure
and/or reputational damage and so this provides the basis of the model risk framework.
6.2.5. This leads to a deﬁnition of model in line with the Working Party’s deﬁnition, although it may
be narrowed to ensure the full weight of the formal governance framework is only applied where
needed, that is, to those models which are sufﬁciently complex and have a real business impact in the
context of the bank.
6.2.6. To ensure a model does not creep in or out of such a deﬁnition without being noticed,
models are classiﬁed according to materiality, and the level of governance varied accordingly.
Thus, the most attention is given to the major models (level 1, say) and there may only be a handful
of these (e.g. below 10). Full governance requirements described below will then be applied
to the next level of models with a lighter touch becoming relevant as you progress down though
the levels ending with an awareness of those models which are just below the qualiﬁcation
for the framework, in case their signiﬁcance should evolve. Materiality will be judged against the
criteria mentioned earlier, that is, purpose (including regulatory signiﬁcance), use and ﬁnancial
signiﬁcance.
6.2.7. A model approved under the framework has a set review date. This is usually annually, but
could be earlier where necessary. As part of this assessment a full set of documentation describing the
model needs to be submitted to the Model Governance Committee. This is presented by the business
area where the model is in use, and has to be signed-off by the second line (the risk team for that
business area) and the independent model approval team.
6.2.8. The model approval team is a central team independent of any business area. It will carry out
a deep dive into models either when they are introduced or substantially changed, or otherwise on a
rolling basis. This deep dive includes building a challenger model, a review of industry practice and a
comparison of the impact of alternative options.
6.2.9. The second line will apply subject matter expertise to their review to ensure the technical
aspects, as well as the statistical aspects, are being dealt with correctly.
6.2.10. Some models are also subject to regulatory scrutiny and the documentation on the review
process may be provided to the regulator as appropriate. Some models require pre approval from the
regulator for new models or major model changes (this is similar to insurance models).
6.2.11. The internal model governance committee will review the submission from the three
independent teams, and may require further information or investigations to be carried out. As part
of the approval, conditions for use will be set, including the review date, any conditions or
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developments which need to be implemented, the purposes for which the model may or may not be
used and the performance monitoring to be carried out.
6.2.12. Performance monitoring, usually carried out quarterly, consists of reviewing Key Perfor-
mance Indicators which will vary between models. These are likely to consider accuracy, dis-
crimination, stability and usage. This monitoring will be carried out between the business, the second
line of defence and the model approval team.
6.2.13. Reporting on the use of the models is then included in internal reporting to senior management.
This will be both at a business level and at a consolidated “model risk” level. It includes a Red-Amber-
Green status against risk appetite. This gives another route by which any emerging problems should be
picked up – senior management will be reviewing the impact of models against risk appetite and so
reliance is not on just the model governance processes to pick up any emerging problems.
6.2.14. Finally, as with all aspects of the business, compliance with model governance and risk
appetite processes in connection with model risk is subject to internal audit review and regulatory
oversight.
6.3. Pensions
6.3.1. Like life insurers, pension schemes put a great deal of reliance on modelling and on experts to
use, understand and review these calculations. Within the pensions industry, models are used to
value, administer and to project both assets and liabilities into the future. Deﬁned beneﬁt pension
liabilities are one of the most material concerns for UK companies and within the industry there is
signiﬁcant pressure on pension schemes due to the low interest rate environment. More and more
companies are looking to better understand the value of their pension liabilities, how these will
develop in the future and, in some cases, the options available to de-risk their balance sheet by
removing the long-tailed pension liabilities through buy-in or full buy-out transactions with bulk-
purchase annuity writers.
6.3.2. Within this section, we will consider model risk speciﬁc to pension schemes by looking at the
regulatory environment, the relationships of the stakeholders and through considering the different
calculations that take place. The aim of this section is to ask if there may be an increased level of
model risk within pension schemes due to the reliance on key individuals or the long-term, complex,
modelling techniques.
6.3.3. The regulatory environment: The current pension regulations within the United Kingdom require
auditors to verify the existence and value of scheme assets, and in the case of deﬁned beneﬁt schemes, an
appropriate actuary must determine whether the fund’s future liabilities can be met from current assets.
These requirements are focussed on the assets that a company holds and the scheme actuary, who will be
the person closest to the liability model, is responsible for valuing any deﬁcit that a company might
include on their balance sheet. In the circumstance that the scheme actuary does not report a deﬁcit, no
formal audit will be required on the liabilities or the models used to produce these values.
6.3.4. This places reliance on scheme actuaries to provide insight to the liability models.
6.3.5. Over the last decade, a number of industries including insurance companies and the banking
sector have been required to signiﬁcantly increase their model documentation and risk management
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framework in managing their business. Pension schemes will soon be subject to the new EU-wide
IORP II (Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision) regulations which require schemes to
implement an effective risk management function similar to the requirements that insurers have seen
as part of Solvency II. One of the key aims of IORP II is for ﬁrms to actively manage and monitor all
key risks to the scheme, which will clearly help to encourage effective model risk management.
6.3.6. Key stakeholders: Considering the current key stakeholders of a pension scheme, there will
likely be a variety of experience and views on model risk.
∙ The scheme actuary, who will be responsible for the valuation model, will be an experienced
actuary and will have a very good understanding of the model, which they have developed. In all
likelihood, the actuary is likely to be a conﬁdent model user and will put stock in the output of
the model.
∙ Scheme trustees will have a variety of experience, but it is clear that the majority of focus will
fall on the assumptions used within the model and the overall valuation results. A signiﬁcant
amount of reliance will be placed on the expertise of the scheme actuary to ensure the model is
appropriate and to inform trustees of any areas of risk.
∙ Employers again will likely place reliance on the scheme actuary to understand the model.
Employers will focus on the assumptions used to value the liabilities, ensure an appropriate asset
return on investments and to understand the level of deﬁcit that the scheme may add to the
company’s balance sheet.
∙ The regulator will play an important role in reviewing the valuation, however, they may not have the
depth of resource to monitor valuations to a level required to consider model risk within the valuation.
It is clear that if a scheme announced a signiﬁcant deﬁcit, then the regulator may take signiﬁcant interest
in the model, but this may only occur in extreme circumstances.
6.3.7. Considering the interactions between the current key stakeholders, there is clearly a question
around appropriate levels of challenge to the scheme actuary on the model. It should be noted that
while the scheme actuary’s models will fall under the same TAS-M (soon to be TAS-100) require-
ments as other actuarial models, the pensions’ legislation is not as prescriptive on schemes to develop
a risk management framework as for insurers under Solvency II.
6.3.8. As mentioned in section 6.3.5, pension schemes will soon require a risk management function to
adopt strategies, processes and procedures necessary to identify, measure, monitor, manage and report
risks. This is a clear step forward in risk governance and reduces the overreliance on scheme actuaries.
6.3.9. It should be noted that, even before the implementation of IORP II, there is detailed information
provided by the scheme actuary with regards to the model inputs and assumptions. A key part of a
valuation report will detail the underlying assumptions of the model, how these have moved since the
previous investigation and a number of sensitivities to these assumptions. In communicating changes to
the stakeholders, the scheme actuary will often be able to use recent experience within the scheme and
the wider industry to frame the reasoning for any changes and to clearly communicate their impact on
the valuation. This information helps stakeholders to relate the inputs of the technical model back to the
real world and their experiences and will result in signiﬁcant challenge to the model.
6.3.10. Model uses: The model risk within a pension scheme calculation will differ due to the nature
and signiﬁcance of the calculation. We will consider a number of important modelling calculations
separately below.
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6.3.11. Scheme liabilities’ valuation: When modelling a tri-annual scheme valuation, any error or
mistake within a model would likely have an impact on the funding plan of the scheme.
6.3.12. When valuing the liabilities of a scheme, trustees and employers will primarily focus on the
assumptions used within the valuation and the results of the model. Trust is placed in the scheme
actuary to develop and run the model and while the assumptions are discussed with trustees, in the
past, the models themselves have received limited exposure or review from either the trustees of
employers. As already mentioned, more challenge to the actuarial models will be developed as part of
the IORP II requirements.
6.3.13. During such a valuation, there are clearly a number of checks that will be performed to
ensure the model is appropriate. The scheme actuary will perform checks as with any important
actuarial model and trustees will have years of experience to compare against model outputs. Sen-
sitivity testing is provided on the results of a valuation model and will help to highlight the key
assumptions. Comparing the requirements of the scheme to other areas of insurance, schemes are not
required to do the same level of testing around stress and scenario testing and reverse stress testing
that has been developed under Solvency II, which may help to show weaknesses within a model.
6.3.14. Assets: When considering the models used to measure and project the assets held by a pension
scheme, due to the complex nature of the investments available, the options for deterministic or sto-
chastic modelling and the long-term projections, this is an area where there is signiﬁcant tangible model
risk, particularly with the asset-liability modelling underlying some of the investment strategy decisions.
6.3.15. Model risk is limited by the requirement of an audit on the asset values and through
appropriate actuarial requirements to document and communicate models with key stakeholders.
6.3.16. Risk transfers: A number of pension scheme have undergone risk transfers and de-risking
processes. In order to value the transaction, the scheme actuary, the corresponding ﬁrm looking to
take on the business and the auditors of transfer will all calculate or review a proposed value of the
scheme.
6.3.17. In this occasion, there is an increased scope for model risk due to the “one off” nature of the
transaction to transfer the scheme, as corrections to any error cannot be implemented after the
business has been agreed and transferred. However, the level of model risk within these calculations
is mitigated somewhat by having insight from auditors and regulators.
6.3.18. Key models: longevity projections: Longevity risk is an important focus when calculating
deﬁned beneﬁt pension liabilities. Due to the long-term nature of this risk, models are required to
provide insight of future mortality rates, sometimes decades in advance. These projections have
signiﬁcant impact on the present value of the liabilities within the scheme.
6.3.19. We do know that the nature of longevity risk and the way models are used will vary between
schemes and it is helpful to distinguish between three types of longevity risk and assumptions:
∙ Level risk: The risk that the best estimate assumption of the scheme’s current mortality experience
is inaccurate.
∙ Process risk: The risk that the best estimate assumption is not borne out in practice, due to the
random nature of mortality.
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∙ Trend risk: The risk that the assumption made regarding future changes in expected mortality
rates is wrong.
6.3.20. The complexity of models used to collect data, analyse trends and to produce assumptions
will vary signiﬁcantly between these risks, meaning there will be different levels of inherent model
risk within the calculations. Considering the nature of the models, the most likely area of model risk
will relate to the projection of trend risk, which would certainly be the major component for large
schemes.
6.3.21. Modelling trend risk: Over the 21st century, the modelling techniques for trend risk have
developed signiﬁcantly. While small- or medium-sized schemes may only have the capacity to
develop simplistic deterministic models; larger schemes aim to reduce their longevity risk by mod-
elling future improvements as accurately as possible through a variety of methods (e.g. various
standard stochastic models or cause-of-death models). However, in doing this, greater reliance is
placed on the scheme actuary’s modelling capabilities and, in advancing the modelling techniques,
extrapolating mortality rates into the future still involves unknowable risks.
6.3.22. The level of potential model risk is exacerbated by the technical difﬁculty that is present in
many of the calculations. Communicating the modelling approach used in a less technical setting
may be difﬁcult and/or time-consuming. This may suggest that there will be limited challenge of the
trend model from trustees and employers.
6.3.23. Model risk, based on misunderstanding or misuse of a model, can be reduced by including
sensitivity testing within the communications to the scheme trustees and senior management. This will
illustrate the importance of the assumptions produced by the trend model to the overall value of the
scheme liabilities. As trustees may have limited interest or understanding of the workings of such a
complex model, industry practice is to illustrate what particular future improvements might mean in
reality, for example, through a cause-of-death approach. Schemes can also rely on well-regarded
professional bodies such as the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ ContinuousMortality Investigation who
produce industry standards and benchmarking surveys that models can be compared against. The scheme
actuary can provide trustees and employers with a comparison of the assumption against the range (e.g.
generally long-term rates of mortality improvement sit in a range of 1.25%–1.75% p.a.). This can provide
comfort to the ﬁnal output of the model, even if the actuary has used different methods to get there.
6.3.24. Considerations for actuarial models: Model risk exists in pension schemes just like all other
areas of business where the computing power of models provide assistance. Compared to other
ﬁnancial sectors, there may be less scrutiny applied to liability models within pension schemes and
signiﬁcant reliance is placed on the modelling expertise of the scheme actuary. However, we expect
an increased focus on risk management going forward following the implementation of IORP II.
6.3.25. We know that due to the long-term nature of the liabilities and the corresponding con-
tributions from employers, individual errors due to model risk may be seen as less material and easily
corrected, however, there will be ﬁnancial impacts and these may be exacerbated if the problem is a
deeper misunderstanding that is not highlighted when comparing to benchmarks, analysing sensi-
tivities or undergoing audits.
6.3.26. Considering longevity trend risk, we know that actuarial models have failed to predict the
levels of improvements we have seen – both the sustained heavy improvements of recent decades and
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the slow-down of recent years. These complex models are seen by many within the pensions industry
as a “black box”, used to produce results. It is only through encouraging conversations and
developing appropriate independent checks that we can try to reduce the risk that future errors are
not caused by model errors which could have been avoided.
6.4. Links to TAS-100
6.4.1. A new TAS, TAS-100: Principles for Technical Actuarial Work (TAS-100), has been issued by
the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and comes into effect on 1 July 2017.
6.4.2. TAS-100 will replace the current TAS’s that cover modelling, data and reporting (TAS-M,
TAS-D and TAS-R), and is described fully here: https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/
Actuarial-Policy-Team/TAS-100-Principles-for-Technical-Actuarial-Work.pdf
6.4.3. The purpose of TAS-100 is to promote high-quality technical actuarial work. It supports the FRC’s
Reliability Objective that “users for whom actuarial information is created should be able to place a high
degree of reliance on that information’s relevance, transparency of assumptions, completeness and
comprehensibility, including the communication of any uncertainty inherent in the information”. As such,
there are strong links to any discussion of model risk and model risk communication.
6.4.4. The Models section from TAS-100 captures some of key elements we have expanded on
throughout this paper. A paraphrased extract from TAS-100 covering the principles for Models is set
out below:
∙ models used in technical actuarial work shall be ﬁt for the purpose for which they are used and be
subject to sufﬁcient controls and testing so that users can rely on the resulting actuarial information;
∙ an explanation of how a model is ﬁt for the purpose for which it is used and what it does shall be
documented;
∙ controls and tests that have been applied to a model shall be documented;
∙ communications shall explain the methods and measures used in the technical actuarial work and
describe their rationale;
∙ communications shall include an explanation of any changes to the methods and measures used
from the previous exercise carried out for the same purpose (if one exists); and
∙ communications shall include explanations of any signiﬁcant limitations of the models used and
the implications of those limitations.
6.4.5. Considerations for actuarial models: As can be seen in our section 3 (Model Risk Commu-
nication) these principles are in line with our approach. We believe that applying these principles will
aid in the understanding of the model risk inherent in certain results.
6.4.6. That said, a very detailed approach to these principles could be taken. However TAS-100 also
sets out that in applying the principles to a piece of work, a proportionate approach is expected. The
discussions in this paper cover many of the principles and hence provide some background when
considering how to apply these principles to a speciﬁc piece of work.
6.4.7. For example, in section 5.4.3 (Lessons From the Auditors) we discuss the challenges from the
auditors around models using appropriate methodology, being “correct” within that methodology,
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for these models to have been developed and tested in a controlled manner, and so on. The principles
set out in the TAS-100 provide a framework for making decisions which will then be robust to the
challenge from auditors and other third party users. Compliance will naturally result in evidence that
only the latest signed-off models have been used, and evidence of controls around model operation.
Where a bespoke model has been developed, we would expect applying TAS-100 to result in evi-
dence of peer review and sense checking of results being available and hence the auditors’ challenge
to be easily addressed.
7. Summary Conclusions
7.1.1. In section 1 we recapped the Model Risk Working Party’s Phase I work (Model Risk – Daring
to Open the Black Box). In section 2, we reviewed a number of high-proﬁle case studies which
demonstrate that the ﬁnancial and reputational impacts of model risk can be very substantial.
In section 3, examples of model risk communication have been given covering communication to a
range of audiences: to the Board; to the regulator; and to external stakeholders.
7.1.2. In section 4, we presented a practical framework for model risk management and quantiﬁ-
cation with examples of the key actors, processes and cultural challenge. Section 5 presented some
lessons learned from other industries that make extensive use of models including the weather
forecasting, software and aerospace industries. Finally, in section 6 a series of case studies in practical
model risk management and mitigation were presented from the contributors’ own experiences
covering primarily ﬁnancial services.
7.1.3. Key points we wish to summarise from the paper are:
∙ As acknowledged by NASA, the two key reasons for the failure of the MCO were: an
inappropriate culture and inadequate communication. To mitigate these failures, communication
channels needed to be improved and personnel urged to question and challenge everything – even
those things that have always worked or which appear routine.
∙ From the “Growth in a Time of Debt” case study, we have seen the importance of transparency in
fostering conﬁdence in models and their results. It is exactly this transparency, common in
some (though not all) areas of academic research, that allowed the errors to be discovered.
Such transparency is not easily attainable for many models deployed within the ﬁnancial
industry. Consequently, one can only speculate as to the number and impact of errors that sit
undetected.
∙ As presented in section 3 (Model Risk Communication), good communication of model risk to
internal and external stakeholders adds value and promotes conﬁdence; particularly as model risk
events become more prevalent in the media and because model risk relates directly to the results on
which regulators and investors rely.
∙ Section 4 (Practical Implementation of a Model Risk Management Framework) stressed the
importance and beneﬁts of maintaining an up-to-date central inventory of all models and classifying all
models them into Basic/Medium/High risk. The model risk management effort should be proportionate
to the risk a model poses. Third party software, relied on by a majority of ﬁnancial services companies,
should be treated in exactly the same way as in-house models.
∙ The importance of regular independent model validation has been highlighted. By this we mean
independent validation by people who have no involvement in the design and operations of the
particular model being validated. The frequency of review will be at management’s discretion but
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we suggest as a minimum each High risk model being reviewed at least once every 3 years on a
rolling basis.
∙ The lessons learned from other industries (section 5) reiterate some of the points from earlier sections
but from a non-ﬁnancial services perspective. Of relevance from the weather forecasting case study is
the emphasis on measuring user satisfaction around a model’s results; do they satisfy the users’
purpose? Studying the aerospace industry suggests there is value in questioning whether actuarial
models and their processes have clearly deﬁned “operating envelopes” to ensure that they are not
used beyond the boundaries of their design.
∙ In section 6 we have brought to life some of the practical challenges and mitigating actions that the
contributors have experienced in a variety actuarial ﬁelds.
∙ Appendix concludes the paper by giving an example model risk policy to show how a model risk
management framework has been successfully implemented within a large ﬁnancial organisation.
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Appendix: Example Model Risk Policy (As Presented to the IFOA CRO Group)
The concept of a Model Risk Management Framework was developed in the Phase 1 paper;
subsequent feedback challenged how this can be implemented in a practical and proportionate
manner. The Working Party therefore developed a full example “Model Risk Policy” to illustrate
how a model risk management framework could be practically implemented in an insurance com-
pany. This Model Risk Policy is set out in full here and was presented to the IFoA CRO Group by
members of the Working Party (N. Morjaria, L. Witts and C. Hughes) on 14 November 2016.
Section 4 focusses on some of these speciﬁc areas in further detail.
Model Risk Policy
1. Model Risk Identiﬁcation
Policy
All models in use must be identiﬁed and recorded in the model inventory system, to ensure they are
subject to appropriate controls in line with the Model Risk Policy.
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Accountabilities
Chief Risk Ofﬁcers (CROs), Model Owners
Requirements
■ CROs are responsible for ensuring that all models used by their legal entity are identiﬁed, and
recorded in the model inventory system.
■ The Federal Reserve’s Model Deﬁnition should be used for model identiﬁcation – a model is a
quantitative method, system or approach that produces a prediction or estimate, which directly
impacts business, account or transaction-level decisions. The prediction or estimate can take
multiple forms (i.e. forecast, distribution, valuation, etc.) and by their nature are subject to error or
uncertainty which introduces risk to the organisation.
■ Model Owners are responsible for ensuring the information in respect of their models in the model
inventory system is complete, up-to-date and accurate.
■ For each model, speciﬁc mandatory ﬁelds (e.g. model type, usage(s), Owner, User(s), risk control
level, description) must be completed in the model inventory system.
■ Information should be recorded in the model inventory system at a model usage level, unless it is
deemed appropriate by the Model Owner to record speciﬁc model components separately, for
example, for external models
Practical Considerations
■ There is a risk, given the deﬁnition of a model, that the number of models recorded in the
inventory would run to hundreds/thousands, thereby providing a signiﬁcant overhead for
maintenance and also adding limited value to the organisation.
■ Therefore, by focussing on usage level, the number of records is likely to be more manageable, and
also aligns well with validation (i.e. assessment of models for ﬁtness for purpose). It is expected
that entities will have records on the inventory system for at least the following usages (where
applicable):
- Regulatory Reserves/Capital
- Embedded Value
- Stress Testing
- Economic Capital
- Product/Reinsurance Pricing
- Business Planning/Forecasting
- Asset–Liability Management
- Customer Beneﬁt illustration
- Discretionary beneﬁts
■ All CROs and Model Owners (and relevant delegates) will require access and training on the
model inventory system.
■ It will also be necessary to have central inventory expert contacts to provide support to Model
Owners and Users.
■ There may need to be a regular (e.g. annual) attestation process from CROs and Model Owners
around the completeness and accuracy of the inventory.
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2. Assignment of Key Model Roles
Policy
Appropriate individuals or groups must be assigned to each of the key model governance roles for all
models.
Accountabilities
CROs
Requirements
CROs are responsible for ensuring that for all models appropriate individuals or groups are assigned
to each of the following key roles:
■ Model Owners: responsible for maintenance of information in the model inventory system, model risk
prioritisation (MRP), compliance with model risk control standards, sign-off of model developments/
changes, model monitoring, liaising with the Model Reviewer, submitting Residual Risk Assessment
■ Model Users: responsible for the model being used appropriately and only using the model after
approval by Model Approver.
■ Model Reviewer: responsible for performing independent validation/reviews of models.
■ Model Approver: responsible for reviewing Residual Risk Assessments and approving the use
(or limited use) of the model.
Practical Considerations
■ Key roles may typically be as follows:
■ Model Owners: Chief Actuary
■ Model Users: Chief Financial Ofﬁcers (CFOs), CROs
■ Model Reviewer: Model Validation team/External reviewers for High and Medium Control
level models; less robust independence required for Basic Control level models.
■ Model Approver: Dependent on the Risk Control Level of the Model, the Model Approver
differs:
■ High control level models require Group Model Risk Committee approval (and pre-
approval from the entity Model Risk Committee where relevant).
■ Medium control level models require entity Model Risk Committee approval.
■ Basic control level models require Model Owner approval.
■ However, given the seniority of the Chief Actuary, CROs and CFOs, they are likely to delegate
day-to-day activities to relevant team members.
■ There is a signiﬁcant cost (either internal or external) associated with Independent Model
Validation/ Review, therefore the frequency and level of independence of review (and therefore the
cost) will vary will the Risk Control level of the model (see later section on Model Review).
3. MRP
Policy
Model Owners must ensure that MRP Grades and Risk Control levels are determined for each of
their models and recorded in the model inventory system, to enable management to prioritise model
Model risk: illuminating the black box
53
at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321717000150
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 138.40.209.17, on 23 Oct 2017 at 14:22:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
governance, activities and resources according to the materiality of models and their potential risks
to the business.
Accountabilities
Model Owners
Requirements
■ Model Owners are responsible for determining a MRP Grade and Risk Control Level for all of
their models.
■ The MRP Grade should be determined by assessing the model against centrally speciﬁed
quantitative model materiality thresholds. Subsequently a Risk Control Level (High/Medium/
Basic) should be determined based on the materiality of the model, the extent of its regulatory
scrutiny, and its strategic importance within the group.
■ Model Owners should review MRP Grades and Risk Control Levels assigned to their models at
least annually. The Model Approver should be notiﬁed of any changes and the model inventory
system updated accordingly.
Practical Considerations
■ A generic tool can easily be developed to support the MRP and Risk Control Level assessment
process.
■ The Risk Control Level drives the components of the Policy which need to be followed (in
particular, the level of documentation and validation required). It is therefore key to ensure that
the distribution of models between Risk Control Levels is appropriate and aligns to available
resourcing.
4. Model Risk Control Standards
Policy
Controls should be applied when developing and operating models to mitigate model risk. The level
of controls will depend on the Risk Control Level of the model.
Accountabilities
Model Owners, Model Users
Requirements
■ Model Documentation: Model Owners must ensure that their models are properly documented and
that the level of documentation is commensurate with the nature, scale and complexity of the model
■ Data Quality: Data used in model calculations must be ﬁt for the purpose for which it is being used.
■ Model Methodology and Assumptions: The methodologies and assumptions used in models must
be based on robust and appropriate techniques and data.
■ Expert Judgements are robust, transparent and open to challenge, so that Model Users can place
reliance on the judgements and be aware of their impacts on the model outputs.
■ Model Limitations are understood by Model Users to avoid misuse of the model or model output.
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■ Model Implementation and Use: Model Users must mitigate the risk of incorrect or inappropriate
use of models or model outputs.
■ Model Changes are appropriately tested and signed-off before being implemented.
■ External Models must comply with the same model risk control standards as internally developed
models.
Practical Considerations
■ Basic Control level models only require simple information, covering:
■ Model description;
■ Summary of model methodology and assumptions;
■ Key expert judgements and limitations underlying the model, and supporting rationale for
these;
■ Data Flow Charts; and
■ Logs of model changes.All of this information can be included in a single document.
■ There may be separate more detailed standards on setting best estimate assumptions.
■ Companies have found it helpful to develop a suite of template documents for items such as expert
judgement log, limitations log, etc.
■ These standards are generally cut-down/simpliﬁed versions of the Solvency II internal model
standards made proportionate for the business, so should be familiar for many companies.
5. Model Monitoring
Policy
On-going monitoring must be carried out to evaluate whether changes in business practices, internal
or external factors necessitate adjustment, redevelopment or replacement of a model.
Accountabilities
Model Owners, CROs
Requirements
■ Model Owners are responsible for assessing that a model remains ﬁt for its purpose
(methodologies, assumptions, expert judgements and limitations) on an annual basis.
■ For High and Medium Control Level models, model monitoring should assess whether:
(1) the model methodology is robust;
(2) assumptions, parameters, data, limitations and expert judgements are appropriate and
relevant;
(3) technical documentation is complete and up-to-date;
(4) model process documentation is complete and up-to-date;
(5) change control processes have been followed;
(6) controls for the model are operating effectively;
(7) the model complies with the Model Risk Policy and regulatory requirements.
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■ All ﬁndings should be reported to the Model User(s) and Model Approver.
■ The performance of ﬁnancial and regulatory reporting models should be assessed on a quarterly
basis by analysing the deviation between actual experience and the expected results.
■ CROs must inform Model Owners when there is a change in risk proﬁle of the business.
Practical Considerations
■ This may be a new process for some companies.
■ Model Owners will likely need to attest that the various components of Model Monitoring have
been adhered to. This attestation could be made within the entity Model Risk Committee and
within any output reports for models.
■ More generally, it would be expected that items such as Expert Judgements and Limitations are
tabled for discussion at entity Model Risk Committees to ensure they remain appropriate and
relevant.
■ A Risk Acceptance process will be required for any ﬁndings made during the assessment process
(see section 7 of the Policy on Model Risk Acceptance).
■ To support the above, a Model Risk Committee template may be helpful to ensure the relevant
items are covered regularly.
6. Model Validation/Review
Policy
Models must be subject to validation/review proportionate to their Risk Control level, to assess
whether the model is ﬁt-for-purpose and in line with its design objectives and business uses.
Accountabilities
Model Owners, Model Reviewers
Requirements
■ Model Owners must include all open ﬁndings identiﬁed by the Model Reviewer in the Limitations
log and Residual Risk Assessment.
■ Models with High Risk Control levels require annual review by the Model Reviewer.
■ Models with Medium Risk Control levels require periodic review by the Model Reviewer. Model
Owners to determine the frequency in conjunction with the Group Model Risk Committee.
■ Models with Basic Risk Control levels may not need additional validation / review over and above
regular monitoring; the Model Owner should determine whether this is necessary and if so
coordinate the appropriate Model Reviewer.
■ Model Owners must provide a formal sign-off of their models prior to submission to the Model
Reviewer.
■ Where the Model Reviewer identiﬁes high risk ﬁndings, the Model Owner must develop a
remediation plan to address these ﬁndings and agree that the proposed remediation actions are
appropriate with the Model Reviewer.
■ The Risk Acceptance Process outlined in the next section of this Policy must be followed prior to
implementation/use of the model.
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Practical Considerations
■ Annual reviews of High Risk Control level models may seem very frequent; however, these are
likely to focus on key changes since previous reviews. (This also aligns to regulatory expectations
around the most signiﬁcant models.)
■ The Chair (or relevant deputy) of the Group Model Risk Committee and Model Owners will have
to collectively go through a process to determine review frequencies for Medium Control Level
models based on underlying risks and available resources.
■ For High Risk Control level models, Model Reviewer Reports should be reported to the Group
Model Risk Committee. Subsequently remediation plans must also be presented for high risk
ﬁndings.
■ For Medium Risk Control level models, Model Reviewer Reports should be reported to the entity
Model Risk Committee; as well as subsequent remediation plans in respect of high risk ﬁndings
identiﬁed.
■ Where the Model Reviewer is internal, there will need to be separate detailed standards for the
Model Reviewer to follow; where the Model Reviewer is external, the review scope should be set
by the CRO (or relevant Deputy).
7. Model Risk Acceptance
Policy
Model Owners must assess the residual model risks resulting from issues identiﬁed with their models,
and submit their assessments to the relevant Model Approvers for consideration for risk acceptance
and approval of the use and/or limitation of use of the model, to ensure that risks arising from
models are understood, mitigated and accepted prior to their usage or continued usage.
Accountabilities
Model Owners, Model Users, Model Approvers
Requirements
■ Model Owners are responsible for performing a Residual Model Risk Assessment and submitting
this to the Model Approver at least annually.
■ This is an assessment of the remaining model risk after controls and any mitigation has been
applied.
■ The Model Approver should review the Residual Model Risk Assessment and formally risk
accept residual risks where deemed appropriate, in line with the relevant entity’s (Model) risk
appetite.
■ Model Users should only use models approved by the Model Approver.
Practical Considerations
■ This concept is new and likely to take some time to embed. Logs of outstanding issues will need to
be approved by the relevant Model Approver (Committee or individual depending on Risk
Control Level).
■ The Residual Risk Assessment should incorporate all Medium and High Risk ﬁndings identiﬁed
through Model Monitoring, Model Validation/Review, Internal Audit, and External Audit.
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■ A Residual Risk Assessment Log should be maintained (the Working Party will develop a
template). This should capture:
- Model name;
- Summary of the issues/ﬁndings;
- Risks (before mitigation) presented by the issues/ﬁndings;
- Action Plan (remediation plans and mitigating controls);
- Action Owner(s);
- Residual Risk Rating; Residual Risks to be accepted; and
- Reason(s) why the Residual Risks should be accepted.
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